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BUSINESS AND INSURANCE LAW
I. INSURERS' BAD FAITH HANDLING OF FIRST PARTY CLAIMS: A
NEW CAUSE OF ACTION N TORT
In Nichols v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.,1 the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized a cause of
action in tort for bad faith in an insurer's handling of a first
party claim.2 Mr. Nichols' 1969 Corvette, a collector's item, was
stolen from behind the federal courthouse in Columbia, South
Carolina.3 Nichols, the plaintiff, complained of his theft insurer's
failure to deal in good faith in processing his claim.4 This cause
of action was first recognized by the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia in Gruenberg v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.5 More recently, in
Robertsen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
the Federal District Court for the District of South Carolina pre-
dicted that such an action would be recognized by the South
Carolina court.
As did the Gruenberg and Robertsen courts, the South Car-
olina Supreme Court in Nichols based its decision on an "im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party
1. 279 S.C. 336, 306 S.E.2d 616 (1983).
2. For a full discussion of the theories underlying this decision, see infra at p. 279.
3. Record at 20.
4. Record at A14-18.
5. 9 Cal.3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 CaL Rptr. 480 (1973).
6. 464 F. Supp. 876 (D.S.C. 1979); see also Business Law, Annual Survey of South
Carolina Law, 32 S.C.L. REv. 1 (1980).
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will do anything to impair the other's rights to receive benefits
under the contract."'7 The court further stated that this duty is
merely another aspect of the duty which gives rise to a cause of
action for unreasonable failure to settle a third party claim
within policy limits, as set forth in Tyger River Pine Co. v. Ma-
ryland Casualty Co.
8
The "Tyger River Doctrine," however, is based on the in-
surer's fiduciary duty to represent and defend the insured in an
action by a third party.9 No such relationship exists between the
parties in a case such as Nichols. The dispute in Nichols was
between two contracting parties. It is thus difficult to extrapo-
late an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing between
the parties to a contract from a fiduciary duty to act reasonably
when representing the interests of an insured. Both duties, how-
ever, arise from a policy of consumer protection.
In addition, there is ample support for implying a covenant
of good faith into insurance contracts. As the court in Nichols
points out, it has long been recognized that insurance contracts
are "affected with a public interest."10 It has also long been rec-
ognized that there is a large disparity between the relative bar-
gaining powers of parties to an insurance contract. "An insured
does not contract to obtain any kind of commercial advantage or
leverage but only to protect himself against accidental [or una-
voidable] loss." ' Thus, while Nichols cannot be viewed merely
as an extension of the Tyger River Doctrine, the decision in
Nichols is consistent with prior case law in South Carolina.12
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court reiterated, in
Carter v. American Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,13 its recognition
7. 279 S.C. at 339, 306 S.E.2d at 618; see also 9 Cal.3d at 573, 510 P.2d at 1037, 103
Cal. Rptr. at 485.
8. 279 S.C. at 339-40, 306 S.E.2d at 619 (referring to Tyger River Pine Co. v. Mary-
land Casualty Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933)). An action under the "Tyger River
Doctrine" allows the insured to recover damages in excess of policy limits for which he
was held personally liable when the insurer unreasonably refuses to settle within policy
limits. See also Miles v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 374, 120 S.E.2d 217 (1961).
9. 170 S.C. at 292, 170 S.E. at 348.
10. 279 S.C. at 340, 306 S.E.2d at 619; see, e.g., Hinds v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 248
S.C. 285, 149 S.E.2d 771 (1966).
11. 279 S.C. at 340, 306 S.E.2d at 618 (quoting Trinper v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 540
F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (D.S.C. 1982)).
12, See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 6, 9 & 10.
13. 279 S.C. 367, 307 S.E.2d 225 (1983). In Carter, the trial judge sustained the
insurer's demurrer prior to the decision in Nichols. The South Carolina Supreme Court,
[Vol. 36
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol36/iss1/4
BusiNEss AND INSURANCE LAW
of a cause of action for bad faith refusal to pay first party bene-
fits, in a companion case, Diane Carter v. American Mutual Fire
Insurance Co.,14 the court limited standing in such an action to
a named insured or a party to the insurance contract. 5 Thus,
although an action for bad faith refusal to pay insurance bene-
fits is an action in tort, standing to bring such an action has
been limited by the terms of the insurance contract. This limita-
tion is consistent with the basis of the action because the duty to
act in good faith is an implied contractual duty owed only to
those who are parties to the contract.'
Unfortunately, the court in Nichols failed to adequately de-
fine "bad faith" in the context of this action. The court said only
that recovery may be had if the insured can demonstrate bad
faith or unreasonable action in processing the claim.'7 Thus, it is
difficult to predict the standard of behavior required by Nichols
to avoid liability. The court in Nichols did, however, give two
indications of what may constitute bad faith. First, in the some-
what abbreviated discussion of the trial court's refusal to charge
that the insurer's actions could not be in bad faith if its actions
were within its legal rights, the court said that the issue was not
the insurer's right to take the action, 8 but whether in taking
that action the insurer demonstrated bad faith.'9 Second, the su-
preme court approved the trial court's charge that negligence
could constitute bad faith,2 0 stating thiat "the jury is entitled to
consider negligence on the issue of unreasonable refusal to pay
benefits." 21 The court, however, did not indicate whether mere
negligence, standing alone, will support an action of this kind.
Two recent California cases may help illuminate the definition
relying on Nichols, reversed the demurrer to the cause of action. Id. at 368, 307 S.E.2d at
226.
14. 279 S.C. 368, 307 S.E.2d 227 (1983).
15. The plaintiff in Diane Carter alleged that the unreasonable conduct of the in-
surer of the family home, which was titled in her husband's name, had damaged her
inchoate dower interest in that home. The trial court sustained the defendant's demur-
rer, and the supreme court affirmed. Id. at 369, 307 S.E.2d at 227. The court refused to
extend the Nichols cause of action "to a person who is not a party to or a named insured
under the insurance contract. . . ." Id. at 370, 307 S.E.2d at 227.
16. 9 Cal.3d 566, 576, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486.
17. 279 S.C. at 342, 306 S.E.2d at 620.
18. Id. At issue was the insurer's nonrenewal of the insured's policy.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The court cites Tyger River and Robertsen.
1984]
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of bad faith that will be applied in South Carolina actions for
unreasonable refusal to pay first party benefits. First, in Johan-
son v. California State Auto Association Inter-Insurance Bu-
reau,22 the California court apparently adopted a standard of
strict liability in third party excess liability cases. The court in
Johanson held that although the insurer's refusal to settle a
claim within policy limits may stem from the good faith belief
that coverage does not exist, "an insurer who denies coverage
does so at its own risk. ' 23 If the denial is wrongful, the insurer
may be liable for damages in tort.24 Similarly, in Neal v. Farm-
ers Insurance Exchange,25 the California Court of Appeal found
that the insurer's lack of a colorable defense was bad faith in
and of itself.
26
The standard of conduct in South Carolina may prove to be
that applied by the district court in Robertsen and in Trimper v.
Nationwide Insurance Co.27 In Robertsen, Judge Blatt held that
an insured is entitled to recover tort damages upon a showing
that the insurer's failure to pay was "willful, or in reckless disre-
gard of [the insured's] rights. s28 The court cited with approval
the Seventh Circuit case of Craft v. Economy Fire and Casualty
Co., 20 which held that the insured need only show a lack of rea-
sonable cause for denial.30 More recently, the district court in
Trimper held that an insured must show "the absence of a rea-
sonable basis for the denial of benefits, and the insurer's knowl-
22. 15 Cal.3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
23. Id. at 13, 538 P.2d at 748, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 292 (quoting Communale v. Traders
& General Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d 654, 660, 328 P.2d 198, 202 (1958)). See Zurek, First Party
Insurance: Claims, Practices and Procedures in Light of Extra-Contractual Damage Ac-
tions, 27 DRAKE L. REv. 666, 674 (1978).
24. 15 Cal.3d at 13, 538 P.2d at 748, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
25. 64 Cal. App.3d 966, 135 Cal. Rptr. 105 (1976), vacated 68 Cal. App.3d 422, 137
Cal. Rptr. 660 (1977), vacated 21 Cal.3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978).
26. 21 Cal.3d at 921, 582 P.2d at 985, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 394. The court in Neal also
stated that the "terms of 'good faith' and 'bad faith'.. . are not meant to connote the
absence or presence of positive misconduct of a malicious or immoral nature." Id. at 921
n.5, 582 P.2d at 986 n.5, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 395 n.5. That type of misconduct is more
properly considered in the determination of liability for punitive damages. See Zurek,
supra note 23, at 675.
27. 540 F. Supp. 1188 (D.S.C. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes 6 & 11.
28. 464 F. Supp. at 884.
29. 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1978).
30. Id. at 573. Thus, the burden in Craft seems lighter than that in Robertsen which
purports to follow Craft. The court in Craft also stated that punitive damages could be
awarded for "fraud, malice, gross negligence [and] oppressive conduct." Id. at 574.
[Vol. 36
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edge or reckless disregard of a reasonable basis for the denial." 31
An insurer's actions have been held to be reasonable where
a valid defense may be asserted, 2 where there exists a "good
faith legal controversy"3 3 or a legitimate question of statutory
construction or constitutional law, or where there is a bona fide
factual uncertainty. 4 As stated by the court in Noble v. Na-
tional American Life Insurance Co.,35 in order to recover for
breach of the insurer's duty of good faith, the insured must show
that no reasonable basis existed for denying "benefits. The find-
ing of unreasonableness in Gruenberg was based upon the insur-
ance adjuster's erroneous charges of arson and the insurer's re-
fusal to settle even after the insured was cleared of these
charges.36 Similarly, liability for compensatory damages in Neal
was founded on the insurer's failure to settle when no colorable
defense existed. In both those cases, as in Nichols, the in-
surer's delay was also a factor.
As pointed out earlier, the court in Nichols provides little
guidance in determining what constitutes bad faith or unreason-
able behavior. However, the jury must ultimately decide whether
the insurer's actions violated its duty to deal in good faith.
Therefore, "[t]he test of what behavior is reasonable [will] not
be based on what the insurer considers reasonable ... but,
rather, on what a reasonable person in the position of the in-
sured would have understood the contract to mean."38
In addition to consequential damages in a Nichols action,
an insurer may be liable for punitive damages as well.39 If the
insured can show that the "insurer's actions were willful or in
reckless disregard of the insured's rights, he can recover punitive
31. 540 F. Supp. at 1194.
32. See Crawler Supply Co. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 391 So.2d 1223 (La. Ct.
App. 1980).
33. See Anderson v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 6 Kan. App.2d 163, 170, 627 P.2d 344,
349 (1981). See also Wiggins v. Travelers Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 211 (D.S.C. 1979), afl'd,
636 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1980).
34. See Liddell v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 102 Mich. App. 636, 302 N.W.2d
260 (1981).
35. 128 Ariz. 188, 624 P.2d 866 (1981).
36. 9 Cal.3d at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
37. 21 Cal.3d at 921, 582 P.2d at 985, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
38. Zurek, supra note 23, at 678.
39. 279 S.C. at 340, 306 S.E.2d at 619.
1984]
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damages. '40 This holding is consistent with that of Silberg v.
California Life Insurance Co.,41 a California case decided
shortly after Gruenberg. The Silberg court held that an insured
must show that the insurer acted with the "intent to vex, injure
or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the [insured's]
rights.
'42
The standard for the recovery of punitive damages an-
nounced in Nichols does seem to fall short of the burden of
proof traditionally borne by the insured under the doctrine of
Wellborn v. Dixon4 3 for recovery of punitive damages in an ac-
tion for breach of contract accompanied by fraud. It is therefore
clear that the cause of action recognized in Nichols supplants
the common law action for punitive damages for breach of con-
tract and fraud. It also appears to supplant the statutory action
under South Carolina Code section 38-9-320, 4 which provides
for the recovery of attorney's fees for failure of an insurer to act
reasonably in settling a claim.
Professor Zurek has suggested a procedure to be followed by
insurers who have reason to dispute a claim.45 He suggests that a
claim file containing all information pertinent to the claim be
carefully maintained and developed with a view towards litiga-
tion. Zurek also suggests that all correspondence from an in-
sured be dealt with promptly and that insurers should docu-
ment, at a minimum, a sound reason for denying any claim. In
personal injury or disability cases, an independent physician's
report is also well advised. Professor Zurek emphasizes the im-
portance of "educating claims personnel to recognize burgeoning
bad faith claims.146 This common sense approach to avoiding
bad faith claims should help insulate insurers from potential lia-
bility, however arbitrary the definition of bad faith may be.
The supreme court's decision in Nichols will undoubtedly
affect the insurance industry in South Carolina. The appellant
40. Id..
41. 11 Cal.3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
42. Id. at 462, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
43. 70 S.C. 108, 49 S.E. 232 (1904). Under Dixon, the insured must prove actual
fraud to recover punitive damages. Id. at 115-18, 49 S.E. at 234-35. See also Thompson
v. Home Sec. Life Ins. Co., 271 S.C. 54, 244 S.E.2d 533 (1978), and cases cited therein.
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-9-320 (1976). This Code section limits recovery to $2,500.
45. Zurek, supra note 23, at 677-84.
46. Id. at 682.
[Vol. 36
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suggested that recognizing a cause of action in tort for unreason-
able failure to settle a first party claim would "drastically in-
creas[e] litigation. '47 However, only a small percentage of insur-
ance claims are not promptly settled; due to crowded dockets
and indefinite delay, there appears to be little incentive to liti-
gate most claims. 48 The primary impact of the Nichols cause of
action is likely to be that most litigated claims will be brought
seeking compensatory damages in tort, rather than only the
more limited contractual awards available in a contract action.
In fact, it is arguable that the prospect of compensatory and pu-
nitive damages may actually decrease litigation. Until now, the
delay involved in litigating an insurance claim has often worked
in favor of the insurer49 by forcing the insured to settle out of
economic necessity. Furthermore, the insurer has had little to
lose in litigation because damages have been limited to contrac-
tual damages, with the possibility of liability for attorney's fees
if the refusal to settle was in bad faith,50 and the remote possi-
bility of punitive damages if the insured was able to prove
fraud.5 1 Therefore, a cause of action in tort may prove to be a
disincentive to litigation because insurers now have a strong mo-
tive to settle.52
The most telling effect of the Nichols decision is likely to be
increased damage awards when claims are litigated.5 3 In Nichols,
the insured had suffered approximately two thousand dollars in
actual damages.54 The jury, however, awarded a total of $30,000,
which was reduced by the trial court to $20,000.5 It is therefore
necessary for insurance companies and, in particular, claims ad-
justers, to realize the full import of failure to act reasonably in
settling first party claims. Tactics that may have been accepted
ways of doing business in the past may now subject the insurer
to liability for compensatory awards, and possible punitive dam-
47. Brief of Appellant at 29.
48. Amicus Curiae Brief of the South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association at 14.
49. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 43.
51. See Amicus Brief of Trial Lawyers, supra note 48, at 15; see also Wellborn v.
Dixon, 70 S.C. 108, 49 S.E. 232 (1904).
52. See Brief of Appellant at 28.
53. Id. See, e.g., Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, 93 Cal. App.3d 642, 155 Cal. Rptr. 843
(1979).
54. Record at A-41 to A-52 (estimates of car damage after recovery).
55. Record at A-54 to A-55.
1984]
7
Wilkinson et al.: Business and Insurance Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
age awards greatly in excess of ordinary contract claims.
There is, however, one question left unanswered. Will this
cause of action be limited to insurance contracts, or may anyone
who suffers a breach of contract elect to sue in either tort or
contract?"' In his concurring opinion in Security Mutual Casu-
alty Co. v. Transport Indemnity Co.,5 7 Justice Jefferson stated
that, "[T]here exists as a part of every contract a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing which imposes a duty upon each
party not to do anything to injure the right of the other party to
receive the benefits of the agreement."58 The Uniform Commer-
cial Code provides that, "Every contract or duty within this act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or en-
forcement."8 19 Thus, it appears that the action recognized in
Nichols must inevitably expand to all contracts. It has even
been argued that a failure to allow such expansion would violate
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 0 However, as
counsel for the South Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys' Associa-
tion observes, "Protection of the laws is disparate and allowably
so in situations where there is a distinguished class and a ra-
tional basis for the distinction. '61 The special nature of insur-
ance contracts provides that distinction.6 2 However, the recogni-
tion of a cause of action in tort for the wrongful breach of
contracts not involving insurance has yet to occur.
In recognizing a cause of action in tort for the bad faith
handling of a first party claim, the South Carolina Supreme
Court has exposed the insurers in the state to liability in excess
of contractual damages when they fail to act in accordance with
an implied duty of good faith. This cause of action gives the in-
sured a great deal of new leverage. Prior to Nichols, there was
56. See Brief of Appellant at 34-38. See also Amicus Curiae Brief of the South Car-
olina Defense Trial Attorneys Association at 23.
57. 66 Cal. App.3d 1009, 136 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1977).
58. Id. at 1018, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 369 (emphasis in original).
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-203 (1976).
60. See also Amicus Brief of Trial Lawyers, supra note 48, at 23.
61. Amicus Brief of Defense Attorneys, supra note 56, at 22-23.
62. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App.3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1970) and cases cited in footnotes 6, 10 & 11. Although the public policy interest in
insurance contracts is distinct, other jurisdictions in contract actions not involving insur-
ance have awarded punitive damages for extreme behavior. See generally, J. McCARTHY,
PuNrrlva DAMAGES IN BAD F~rH CASES, § 6 (1978 & Supp. 1982) and cases cited therein
(although a 1983 edition has been published, these cases are apparently omitted).
[Vol. 36
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little incentive for an insurer to behave reasonably when its
maximum exposure was the amount it would have to pay in any
case, plus interest and possibly attorney's fees. The Nichols
cause of action eliminates a great deal of the disparity in bar-
gaining positions between the parties to an insurance contract.
Ddna E. Wilkinson
II. AMBIGUITIES OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES STRICTLY
CONSTRUED AGAINST INSURER
In Turkett v. Gulf Life Insurance Co.,63 the South Carolina
Supreme Court rejected the "two contract" theory of contract
interpretation in dealing with an ambiguous life insurance pol-
icy. Although Turkett has limited precedential value because of
its narrow fact situation, the court's decision indicates that am-
biguous insurance policies will continue to be strictly construed
against the insurer."
Turkett was an action by the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy for the payment of death benefits. The insured had com-
mitted suicide. The insurance policy sued upon contained a pro-
vision which barred recovery if suicide occurred "within two
years from the policy date." The controversy centered on the
meaning of the term "policy date." 65
The application for the policy and the conditional receipt
issued for the first premium were dated April 26, 1976. The re-
ceipt stated that if the application was approved, the insurance
would take effect on the date of the application.6 In addition,
the application stated that, "[U]nless effective in accordance
with the provisions of the conditional receipt, no insurance shall
take effect until a policy is actually delivered .... ,,67
The subsequently issued policy was dated May 18, 1976.
This date on the face of the policy was labeled "Policy Date."
63. 279 S.C. 309, 306 S.E.2d 602 (1983).
64. Id. at 311, 306 S.E.2d at 603.
65. Id. at 310, 306 S.E.2d at 602-03.
66. The conditional receipt stated that if the application were approved, the "insur-
ance should take effect on (a) the date of the application, (b) the date of the last medical
examination required by the Company, or (c) the date requested in the application,
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The insured committed suicide on April 30, 1978, more than two
years from the date of the conditional receipt, but less than two
years from the date the policy was issued. 8
The trial court found the terms of the policy clear and un-
ambiguous, adopting the view that the effective date on the re-
ceipt governed only the amount of the plan, the class of risk,
and the premium of the insurance.6 9 The "Policy Date" gov-
erned other provisions contained in the policy, such as the sui-
cide clause.
70
The supreme court expressly rejected this "two contract
theory," citing American National Insurance Co. v. Motta,
7 1
and Holtze v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States.7 2 In both the Motta and Holtze decisions, it was consid-
ered of primary importance that neither party to the insurance
contract intended the creation of two separate contracts.73
The decision in Turkett is consistent with universal accept-
ance of the proposition that exclusionary clauses in insurance
contracts will be strictly construed against the insurer. 4 Turkett
is also consistent with the language of the South Carolina Su-
preme Court in Lesley v. American Security Insurance Co.
75
and Columbia College v. Pennsylvania Insurance Co. 76 that in
interpreting insurance agreements, all related documents, such
as an application or binder, must be considered. Thus, the
Turkett decision is firmly grounded in prior law.7 The Motta,
Holtze and Turkett line of cases, which focus on the intent of
68. Id. at 311, 306 S.E.2d at 602.
69. Record at 45.
70. Id. at 53.
71. 404 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1968).
72. 276 Md. 681, 351 A.2d 139 (1976).
73. 404 F.2d at 169; 276 Md. at 683, 351 A.2d at 143.
74. Abernathy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 274 S.C. 388, 264 S.E.2d 836 (1980);
Boggs v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 272 S.C. 460, 252 S.E.2d 565 (1979). See also
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr.
811 (1973); Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 250 Ga. 613, 299 S.E.2d 561 (1983); Brocme v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 144 Ga. App. 318, 241 S.E.2d 34 (1977); Thomas J. Lipton, Inc. v. Lib-
erty Mutual Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 356, 314 N.E.2d 37, 357 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1974); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E.2d 436 (1967).
75. 261 S.C. 178, 199 S.E.2d 82 (1973).
76. 250 S.C. 237, 157 S.E.2d 416 (1967).
77. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 71 and 72; Manufacturer's Life Ins. Co. v. Capitol
Datsun, Inc., 566 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Crawford v. Mid-America Ins. Co., 488
S.W.2d 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
[Vol. 36
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the parties, are more solidly founded than those cases adopting
the "two contract" theory.7 8 Certainly the application and condi-
tional receipt more accurately reflect the actual intent of the
parties than does the policy unilaterally prepared by the
insurer. 9
When the conditional receipt and the policy in Turkett are
viewed as one contract, there is some ambiguity inherent in the
two effective dates, even though the words "Policy Date" actu-
ally appear on the policy. 0 If two separate effective dates were
intended, the distinction between them should have been made
clear. Any ambiguity in an insurance contract is viewed favora-
bly to the insured; therefore the "Policy Date" in the Turkett
contract was correctly determined by the court to be the date of
the conditional receipt.8"
Diina E. Wilkinson
78. In Crowley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 196 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1952), the court adopted
the date of the policy as the effective date for the operation of the suicide clause. How-
ever, the court stated that the policy date was named as controlling in both the applica-
tion and the policy. Similarly, in Davis v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co., 107 F.2d 150 (4th
Cir. 1939), the decision was based on an express provision as to the controlling date.
Other contrary holdings are attributable to express statutory provisions that a condi-
tional receipt does not constitute part of an insurance contract. See, e.g., Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Summers, 515 F. Supp. 553 (N.D. Ala. 1981) and Loyda v. New England Life Ins.
Co., 409 F. Supp. 754 (D.P.R. 1976). However, at least two courts have adopted the "two
contract" theory. See Oakes v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 516 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
and Byrum v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U.S., 180 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.
1959), aff'd, 274 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830 (1960).
79. This argument is also made by the Appellant in his brief. Brief of Appellant at
8.
80. The Respondent argued, naturally, that the presence of the words "policy date"
on the policy removed any ambiguity. Brief of Respondent at 7.
81. In Jones v. Security General Life Ins. Co., defendant successfully moved to
strike the plaintiff's second cause of action which was based on bad faith refusal to pay
benefits under a first party contract of insurance. Case No. 83-CP-40-4205 (Court of
Common Pleas, Richiand County, April 23, 1984). Plaintiff had premised this cause of
action on the decision in Nichols. The defendant contended that the cause of action first
formally recognized in Nichols could only be applied prospectively and, as the accident
being sued upon occurred prior to the Nichols decision, did not apply in the instant case.
Judge Kinon analogized the recognition of a new cause of action in tort for bad faith
refusal to pay first party insurance benefits to the abrogation of the doctrine of charita-
ble immunity in South Carolina, and held that the cause of action established in Nichols
is to be applied prospectively.
11
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III. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA UNFAIR
TRADE PRACTICES ACT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SHERMAN ANTI-
TRUST ACT
The Fourth Circuit, in Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire
Corp., Commercial Div., 2 interpreted two significant areas of
law. First, the decision discussed section 1 of the Sherman Act8
and then, more importantly, interpreted the South Carolina Un-
fair Trade Practices Act (UTPA).4 The case came to the Fourth
Circuit on appeal from a directed verdict for Michelin. The
court reversed, holding that whether the defendant terminated
the plaintiff's contract to further the aims of competing dealers
by eliminating a price-cutting rival85 and to enforce a price
maintenance scheme was an issue of fact.86 Concerning the un-
fair trade practices claim, the court found that federal antitrust
law did not preempt the application of the South Carolina
UTPA,87 nor was any state law exemption available under sec-
tion 39-5-40(d) of the Act. 8
Bostick Oil Company, an authorized distributor of Michelin
tires, increased its truck tire sales primarily by cutting prices ag-
gressively and giving commission rebates and quantity discounts
to its customers.8 9 These sales practices caused competing
Michelin dealers to complain to field and district level personnel
82. 702 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1983).
83. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal ... ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
84. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to -160 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
85. 702 F.2d at 1215. Michelin alleged that the termination was in response to Bos-
tick's failure to provide service facilities for its customers as required by the dealership
agreement. Id.
86. Id. at 1217-18.
87. Id. at 1219.
88. Id. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40(d) specifically states:
Nothing in this article shall apply to:
(d) Any challenged practices that are subject to, and comply with, stat-
utes administered by the Federal Trade Commission and the rules, regu-
lations and decisions interpreting such statutes.
For the purpose of this section, the burden of proving exemption
from the provisions of this article shall be upon the person claiming the
exemption.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40(d)(1976).
89. 702 F.2d at 1211.
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of Michelin."0 In May 1977, shortly before the renewal date of
Bostick's dealership contract, Michelin's district manager ap-
proached Joe Bostick about enrolling in Michelin's new "Na-
tional Accounts" program (NAP).91 Michelin renewed the deal-
ership contract only after Bostick joined the NAP.92
Bostick continued its aggressive sales practices under the
NAP, giving rebates as high as 15 percent. Complaints from rival
dealers persisted and, in April 1978, Michelin representatives
notified Joe Bostick that his truck tire dealership would not be
renewed. Bostick then brought this action.
Bostick relied on two theories to maintain its Sherman Act
claim. The first theory alleged that the dealership was termi-
nated by Michelin in response to the complaints of competitors,
who resented Bostick's aggressive price-cutting. Bostick main-
tained that this action constituted an unlawful conspiracy. In
addition, Bostick argued that the NAP was a resale price main-
tenance scheme, the enforcement of which required Michelin to
terminate a dealership that continued to lower the manufac-
turer-imposed minimum price for its customers. Bostick also al-
leged unfair or deceptive trade practices by Michelin, in viola-
tion of the South Carolina UTPA.e5 At the close of Bostick's
case the district court granted Michelin's motion for a directed
verdict and Bostick appealed, contending that there was suf-
90. Id. The complaints ultimately reached Michelin's vice president of sales, who
sent a corporate sales manager to talk with Joe Bostick in April 1976. The meeting en-
ded with a renewal of Bostick's dealership for the next year and possibly a promise by
Bostick to expand his service facilities. The complaints from dealers persisted.
91. Id. at 1211-12. The NAP involved various large-volume purchasers designated
"national accounts" who were billed, and whose accounts were collected centrally
through Michelin, while distributors continued to do the actual selling and delivery of
tires for which they were paid a commission. The distributor was required to disclose his
customer lists to Michelin and was not allowed to quote a price for the tires.
92. Id. at 1212. Joe Bostick later testified that he felt "intimidated" into joining the
NAP. Evidence to support this contention included a recommendation by Michelin's dis-
trict manager to Michelin management that Bostick's dealership not be renewed, fol-
lowed by a report expressing optimism that the NAP would alleviate the problem of
"wholesaling and dropping off" by dealers like Bostick, who was identified as a "pressing
problem." Id. Evidence also showed that, despite Bostick's repeated inquiries about re-
newal, the regular dealership expired during negotiations over Bostick's participation in
the NAP. The dealership was renewed one week after Bostick made the first sale through
the program. Id.
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(a)(1976 & Supp. 1983). This Code section states: "Un-
fair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful."
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ficient evidence for these issues to be submitted to a jury."'
A. Sherman Act Violation
Prerequisite to section 1 liability is a "contract, combina-
tion, . . . or conspiracy" which is unreasonably "in restraint of
trade. 's5 Specifically, on remand Bostick must offer evidence to
prove that concerted action existed between Michelin and its
dealers, and that Bostick's truck tire dealership was terminated
"in furtherance of competitors' desires to eliminate a price-cut-
ting rival."96
"Mere complaints do not a conspiracy make. '9 7 However,
the court determined that Bostick had shown more than unilat-
eral action by Michelin." The court made an analogy to Donald
B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp.,9" in which it addressed
the basis upon which the trier of fact could find the " 'requisite
degree of involvement of other parties' to infer a conspiracy
under United States v. Parke Davis & Co."100 In Rice, the court
affirmed the district court's finding of a "combination" despite
the absence of any formal agreement between the manufacturer
and the dealers, and despite the absence of evidence that com-
petitors had ever been consulted by Michelin after complaining
about Rice.101 In Bostick, Michelin's argument supported the
94. 702 F.2d at 1209-10.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1984).
96. 702 F.2d at 1215.
97. Id. at 1213 (citing H.L. Moore Drug Exchange v. Eli Lilly and Co., 662 F.2d 935
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) and Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp.,
514 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Mo. 1981), affd, 671 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1982)).
98. 702 F.2d at 1213. The testimony of Michelin's sales vice president showed per-
sonal knowledge of the controversy between Joe Bostick and Michelin's district manager
over Bostick's pricing practices and knowledge of the complaints by Bostick's rival deal-
ers. It can be inferred that the actions taken by local officials to put pressure on Bostick
resulted from directions given by the vice president to take some action in response to
the complaints. Id. at 1214.
99. 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981).
100. Id. at 16 (quoting Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp.
750, 753-54 (D. Md. 1980)). The court in Bostick omits the citation for United States v.
Parke Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 291 (1960) which held a drug manufacturer to be the orga-
nizer of a price maintenance conspiracy where the manufacturer began a program that
demanded compliance with its suggested retail prices and, not content with merely refus-
ing business relations with any retailer who disregarded the policy, refused to deal with
wholesalers in order to pressure them into enforcing the manufacturer's policies.
101. 638 F.2d at 16. The fact that the competitors of Rice had never been consulted
14
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idea that the termination was more than unilateral, since Miche-
lin admitted that it was responding to the complaints of other
dealers when it terminated Bostick's dealership.
10 2
Other circuits have found section 1 liability upon little more
than termination of a dealer. The Fourth Circuit favorably cited
Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co.,103 a Seventh Circuit
decision, which held "that proof of termination following com-
petitor complaints is sufficient to support an inference of con-
certed action. ' 104 In a footnote, the court in Bostick distin-
guished its holding from that of Girardi v. Gates Rubber
Company Sales Division, Inc. 0 5 and from those of other cases
which have seemingly rejected Girardi.1 6 The court affirmed the
principle that complaints in addition to "such other evidence as
we find here will be enough to raise an issue of fact regarding
[section] 1 concerted activity.'
0 7
On remand, once the existence of a conspiracy has been es-
tablished, Bostick must show that the conspiracy was "in re-
straint of trade.' 1 08 The court, relying on Rice, concluded that a
finding of a per se violation of section 1 would result from a fac-
by Michelin is mentioned in Bostick, 702 F.2d at 1214, but is not mentioned in Rice by
the court of appeals or the district court. Also, evidence at the trial in Rice indicated
that the only complaints were those of rival tire dealers about plaintiff's wholesaling
practices. No other types of complaints from any other sources about any other facets of
Rice's business were received before the decision not to renew. 483 F.Supp. at 754.
102. 702 F.2d at 1214. See supra note 98.
103. 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982).
104. Id. at 1238. In March of 1984, the United States Supreme Court decided Mon-
santo Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984). The Supreme Court re-
jected the assertion by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals that an antitrust plaintiff
could survive a directed verdict on showing that termination of a distributor by a manu-
facturer was in response to dealers' complaints. The Court did affirm the judgment of
the appeals court, but held that something more than evidence of complaints was
needed. On the facts in Monsanto, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have
found a conspiracy between Monsanto and its distributors. In Bostick there was also
more than mere complaints.
105. 325 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963).
106. See, e.g., Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 671 F.2d at 1172; E.J. Sweeny &
Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 243, 256 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 637 F.2d 105 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
107. 702 F.2d at 1215 n.12. The Fourth Circuit refused to adopt the expansive read-
ing of Girardi, that a presumption of conspiracy is created whenever distributors' com-
plaints are followed by a manufacturer's termination of the offending dealer, and empha-
sized that courts which have seemingly rejected Girardi have criticized this expansive
view. The narrow view accepted by the court in Bostick has been preserved. Id.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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tual determination that Michelin terminated Bostick's dealer-
ship to further the desires of rival dealers to eliminate a price-
cutting rival.109 The court reasoned that there is no need to ap-
ply the "rule of reason" analysis, proper when considering man-
ufacturer-imposed vertical restrictions, to a situation in which
the facts indicate a horizontal conspiracy, per se illegal, among
competing dealers and the manufacturer. 1 0
Under Bostick's second theory of liability, the court reached
the conclusion that the National Accounts program satisfied the
concerted action requirement of section 1, since a contractual
agreement between the manufacturer and the dealers actually
existed.11 Based on the evidence, the court held that the district
court was wrong in finding that the program fell short of a per se
illegal resale price maintenance arrangement. The court criti-
cized the finding of "voluntariness," demonstrating that Bos-
tick's participation in the program was hardly voluntary.1 2 The
court noted Michelin's attempt to use the program as a form of
control over the ultimate sales price.113 Seemingly, Michelin
"has taken on this role of a regulator of the horizontal competi-
tion among otherwise legally distinct dealerships selling tires
they legally own.""" If this were found to be true, the plan
would be per se unlawful.1 5
109. 702 F.2d at 1215. The court in Rice defined a horizontal conspiracy as one
"among dealers and their supplying manufacturer for the purpose of retail price mainte-
nance that would benefit the dealers" and, as such, would be illegal. A vertical conspir-
acy is one "involving the same parties but redounding primarily to the benefit of the
manufacturer as a result of increased interbrand competition," and is analyzed under the
rule of reason test. 638 F.2d at 16.
110. 702 F.2d at 1216. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977), the United States Supreme Court supplied three rationales to justify manufac-
turer-imposed restrictions that would enhance interbrand competition at the expense of
lessened intrabrand competition. These are as follows: (1) inducing aggressive retailers to
become dealers to enhance the manufacturer's likelihood of successful entry into a new
market; (2) stemming the "free rider" effect; (3) assuming direct manufacturer oversight
of quality and safety to lessen product liability exposure. One of these benefits must be
shown before a manufacturer-imposed restraint will be analyzed by the "rule of reason."
Thus, Michelin could still show one of these to be applicable, as it did in Rice, and
overcome the label. 702 F.2d at 1216 n.15. The court does not explain the "rule of rea-
son" analysis.
111. 702 F.2d at 1216.
112. Id. at 1216-17.
113. Id. at 1217.
114. Id. at 1218.
115. Id. "Price maintenance schemes have been consistently condemned as illegal,
[Vol. 36
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The Fourth Circuit, in its analysis of the antitrust claims,
defined the elements of a "conspiracy" under the Sherman Act.
It tried to steer a path between cases that refuse to recognize
complaints alone as enough to establish a conspiracy, and cases,
such as Spray-Rite, that recognize the sufficiency of complaints
alone to support an inference of concerted action.116 The court
found more than dealer complaints to support Bostick's conspir-
acy allegation, including other evidence that would at least be
enough to raise an issue of fact to overcome a directed verdict.
The court did not apply the per se doctrine as rigidly as it could
have since it left the possibility that, under certain rationales,
Michelin could overcome the per se label.117 This imposes a
heavy burden on Michelin, as the manufacturer-supplier, to
show that its scheme will benefit its interbrand competitiveness
rather than its dealers.
B. South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act Violation
Bostick alleged that Michelin's practices also violated sec-
tion 39-5-20(a) of the South Carolina Code, which states: "Un-
fair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby
declared unlawful."11 8 The district court suggested that federal
law preempted application of the South Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act (UTPA). The Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding
nothing in the history of federal antitrust regulation that sug-
gested Congress intended to displace state regulation of unfair
trade practices."1 "
The district court also found that section 39-5-40(d) 20 ex-
empted from its coverage all federally regulated conduct. How-
... and are not saved by claims of redeeming interbrand virtues ...... Id. at 1217. See
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), where the Court states "there
are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competi-
tion and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use." Id. at 5. Horizontal price maintenance schemes fall into
the above definition.
116. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 110.
118. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 39-5-20(a)(1976).
119. 702 F.2d at 1219.
120. For the text of § 39-5-40(d), see supra note 88.
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ever, the Fourth Circuit disposed of this contention by noting
that the language in section 39-5-40(d) requires the party claim-
ing the exemption to raise it as an affirmative defense, which
Michelin failed to do. When raised on motion for a directed ver-
dict, the defense is untimely.1 2' The court considered Michelin's
assertion of the exemption to be a timely defense of failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Nevertheless, the
court determined that the exemption was inapplicable to Miche-
lin, because Michelin did not show FTC approval of its manner
of dealer termination. The court held instead that section 39-5-
40 covers activity given a blanket exemption or endorsement by
federal law.
22
In interpreting section 39-5-40, the court of appeals relied
mainly on two South Carolina Supreme Court decisions, State
ex rel. McLeod v. Rhoades123 and State ex rel. McLeod v. Fritz
Waidner Sports Cars, Inc.,124 both of which discussed section
39-5-40(a). Since section 39-5-40(d) had yet to be interpreted,
the court of appeals used the South Carolina court's interpreta-
tion of section 39-5-40(a) as guidance on the scope of the entire
section. The court of appeals viewed section 39-5-40(a) as a
broader provision than section 39-5-40(d), and reasoned that if
Bostick's claims were not exempt under section 39-5-40(a), they
would certainly fail to meet the stricter demands of section 39-5-
40(d). 25
In Rhoades, the court interpreted the words "conduct per-
mitted" in section 39-5-40(a) to mean actions or transactions
"regulated" under laws administered by any regulatory body
acting under statutory authority. 26 Unfair stock trading prac-
121. 702 F.2d at 1219. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). Professor Day of the University of
South Carolina School of Law summarized the procedural status of § 39.5-40 when he
wrote that "[p]roof of an exemption is clearly an affirmative defense." Day, The South
Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act: Sleeping Giant or Illusive Panacea?, 33 S.C.L.
REv. 479, 501 n. 147 (1982).
122. 702 F.2d at 1219.
123. 275 S.C. 104, 267 S.E.2d 539 (1980).
124. 274 S.C. 332, 263 S.E.2d 384 (1980).
125. 702 F.2d at 1219 n.24. Section 39-5-40(a) concerns actions permitted by any
regulatory body, and § 39-5-40(d) addresses practices complying with FTC regulations.
126. 275 S.C. at 107, 267 S.E.2d at 541. The court relied on an interpretation by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court in State v. Piedmont Funding Corp., 119 R.I. 695, 382 A.2d
819 (1978). The Rhode Island Court interpreted "conduct permitted" to mean "conduct
regulated" and held that the sale of securities was exempt from Rhode Island's Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act. Id. at 698-99, 382 A.2d at 822. The South Carolina Supreme
[Vol. 36
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tices were found to be "regulated" under laws administered by
the Securities and Exchange Commission and were therefore ex-
empt from the Act.127 On the other hand, in Fritz Waidner
Sports Cars, the court found the Federal Motor Vehicle Infor-
mation and Cost Savings Act not to be pervasive federal regula-
tion of automobile odometer setting practices; thus, a blanket
exemption for these practices was denied.128 The court of ap-
peals determined that the interpretation given the UTPA by the
South Carolina Supreme Court indicated that the exemption ap-
plied only to "fields extensively governed by federal law, where
federal preemption might otherwise already apply."' 29 The court
concluded that no exemption arose merely by Michelin's asser-
tion that its conduct might not be illegal under federal law.
Rather, Michelin must prove FTC approval of the type and
manner of dealership termination. 130
In addressing the merits of Bostick's claim, the court of ap-
peals concluded that the district court erred in holding that the
Act covered only those practices which would be unlawful under
section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 31 The
Fourth Circuit found the district court's interpretation of the
Act to be overly restrictive since section 39-5-20(b) of the Act
states that "the courts will be guided by the interpretation
given" to the Federal Trade Commission Act.'32 This language,
reasoned the court, did not revoke preexisting South Carolina
definitions of unfair or deceptive trade practices, nor did it bind
the Act to the scope of federal law.'
Court followed suit without indicating whether the exemption applied to all conduct reg-
ulated by federal law or whether it applied only to conduct extensively regulated, such as
the sale of securities.
127. 275 S.C. at 107, 267 S.E.2d at 541.
128. 274 S.C. at 333, 263 S.E.2d at 385.
129. 702 F.2d at 1220.
130. Id.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 5(a)(1)(1976).
132. 702 F.2d at 1220 (emphasis in original).
133. Id. In his article, Professor Day discusses the extent of the state law, quoting
from Murphy v. McNamara, 36 Conn. Supp. 183, 187 n.4, 416 A.2d 170, 174 n.4
(1979)(interpreting identical language in Connecticut's Unfair Trade Practices Act).
"State courts 'are now free to find methods, acts or practices not heretofore specifically
declared unlawful by the FTC or the federal courts prohibited by the [UTPA]. .. ."
Day, supra note 121, at 482 (quoted in 702 F.2d at 1220 n.25). Additional support for
this proposition is found in § 39-5-160 of the Act: "The powers and remedies provided by
this article shall be cumulative and supplementary to all powers and remedies otherwise
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The court of appeals looked at South Carolina law to deter-
mine whether the manner by which Michelin terminated Bos-
tick's dealership could be considered an unfair trade practice.
The court relied on deTreville v. Outboard Marine,14 a case de-
cided by the Fourth Circuit twelve years earlier, which held that,
"It is well settled law in [South Carolina] that regardless of
broad unilateral termination powers, the party who terminated a
contract commits an actionable wrong if the manner of termina-
tion is contrary to equity and good conscience.' 135 In light of
this limit on the power to unilaterally terminate contracts, the
court of appeals held that the jury was entitled to decide if Bos-
tick's dealership was terminated to further an anticompetitive or
unfair purpose.136
The decision in Bostick is interesting because it provides an
expansive view of the practices that may be found unfair, while
imposing an extra burden of proof on the complainant. These
two approaches do not seem consistent. The court's brief discus-
sion of the procedural aspects of claiming an exemption under
the Act does little to clarify the confusing interpretation given
by the South Carolina Supreme Court. In Rhoades, the court
implied that the applicability of the exemption was an affirma-
tive defense, yet it shifted the burden to the plaintiff to come
forward with evidence showing that the particular acts alleged
were not exempt.137 The court of appeals recognized that the
language of section 39-5-40 required Michelin to raise the de-
fense affirmatively, and correctly decided such a defense was un-
provided by law." S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-160 (1976).
134. 439 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1971).
135. Id. at 1100. The court in deTreville found the standard of equity and good
conscience to be more stringent than fraud; the standard applies to an unconscionable
manner of termination as well as to the infliction of needless injury. Id.
136. 702 F.2d at 1220. Of course, if a directed verdict was improper on the legality of
Michelin's manner of termination under the Sherman Act, a directed verdict on this
same question under the UTPA would also be improper. Id. The court of appeals noted
that a showing of fraud was not a prerequisite to establishing liability under the UTPA.
See State ex rel. McLeod v. Brown, 278 S.C. 281, 294 S.E.2d 781 (1982). Also, the UTPA
does not require a showing of the existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy as
is required under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Therefore, a jury could find Michelin guilty of
a violation of the UTPA without finding a violation of the Sherman Act. The court also
concluded that a jury could find Michelin guilty of unfair trade practices without dupli-
cating a verdict on the federal claims. Id. The court expressly prohibited an award of
duplicative damages for violations of both the state and federal claims. Id.
137. 275 S.C. at 107, 267 S.E.2d at 541.
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timely when made on a motion for directed verdict."3 8 Yet, by
allowing the exemption to be raised by a motion of failure to
state a claim, the court has allowed the defendant to avoid the
burden of proving an exemption. This places the burden of proof
on the plaintiff and may discourage small businesses and con-
sumers from bringing suit under the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
The Fourth Circuit's discussion of section 39-5-40(a) also
clarifies some uncertainty created by the South Carolina Su-
preme Court. Although Rhoades interpreted "permitted" to
mean "regulated," a literal application of the word "regulated"
would severly limit the scope of the UTPA since a substantial
amount of business conduct and trade practice is regulated by
federal or state law."3 9 Also, a literal application of "regulated"
would be inconsistent with the Fritz Waidner Sports Cars in-
quiry into the scope and comprehension of the federal law regu-
lating the conduct in question. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation of section 39-5-40(a) as "relat[ing] only to fields
extensively governed by federal law, where federal preemption
might otherwise already apply"140 narrows the exemption and
gives the UTPA a more general application.
Other states with statutory exemptions similar to section
39-5-40(a) have interpreted the exemptions to cover conduct
"expressly permitted" by federal or state regulatory law.1 42 This
138. 702 F.2d at 1219.
139. Id. n.24.
140. Id. at 1220.
141. This was also the approach taken by the Minnesota Supreme Court in its de-
termination that the Federal Communications Commission was not a pervasive regula-
tory scheme with primary antitrust jurisdiction. Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v.
Watonwan T.V. Improvement Ass'n, 294 N.W.2d 297, 305-306 (Minn. 1980).
142. Connecticut amended its Unfair Trade Practices Act in 1976 from "[conduct]
permitted or administered by any regulatory board. . ." to "[conduct] permitted...."
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110c(a)(1)(Supp. 1984)(emphasis added). The Connecticut
legislature expressed its intent that the Act be remedial and the exemption be read nar-
rowly. Consequently, the exemption is interpreted to mean conduct "specifically permit-
ted." Olmsted and Langer, The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, 52 CONN. B.J.
116, 119 (1978).
Similarly, Washington amended the exemption in its Consumer Protection Act to
add "actions or transactions permitted by any other regulatory body." WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 19.86.170 (1978)(emphasis added). The statute also contains a proviso that con-
duct specifically permitted by a regulatory board is not a violation of the Act. Id. The
interpretation of the exemption by the Washington court provides an interesting analysis
of the word "permitted." The court in State v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 81 Wash.2d 259,
501 P.2d 290 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 945 (1973), regarded the exemption to
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interpretation would exempt only conduct that is expressly per-
mitted under other laws as regulations, creating a conflict if the
conduct were actionable under the UTPA. This may be the pre-
ferred approach since it is a more narrow reading of the exemp-
tion than one based on "pervasive regulation" as "preemp-
tion.' 143 There is, however, little indication in Rhoades or Fritz
Waidner Sports Cars that the exemption is to be read so
narrowly.
In addition to an expansive reading of the UTPA,144 the
court of appeals also determined that a unilateral termination of
a contract may be an unfair trade practice. While South Caro-
lina recognizes the legal right to reserve a unilateral power of
termination in a contract, courts may inquire into the motives
behind the exercise of that right. The South Carolina cases cited
in support of this proposition in deTreville v. Outboard Marine
clearly represent the minority view.145 Therefore, the broad in-
terpretation of the scope of the UTPA affords more protection
for contracts between a manufacturer and a third party in South
Carolina than is afforded in the majority of states.
The significance of the Bostick case is its coverage of federal
antitrust law under section 1 of the Sherman Act and, especially
for South Carolina, its interpretation of the South Carolina
UTPA. Bostick enunciates a test for a finding of concerted ac-
tion by recognizing that an inference of such conduct may be
exclude only an activity that requires permission or registration to operate by law and is
thus subject to regulation. From this reasoning, the court concluded that the FTC was
not a regulatory body within the meaning of the statute. 81 Wash.2d at 279-80, 501 P.2d
at 303.
143. Professor Day asserts that "expressly permitted" is the correct interpretion of §
39-5-40(a). Such an interpretation has
common meaning and acceptance, [is] consistent with judicially implied repeal,
preemption, and exemption, permit[s] meaningful distinctions between the
four statutory exemption clauses and promote[s] the legislative purpose of
making the Act an effective tool and a remedy of general application against
unfair or deceptive acts and practices.
Day, supra note 121, at 500. However preferable this interpretation may be, there is
little indication in Bostick that the court of appeals considered this possibility.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
145. Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mutual Tire Stores, 161 S.C. 487, 159 S.E.
825 (1931); Gaines W. Harrison & Sons v. J.I. Case Co., 180 F. Supp. 243 (D.S.C.
1960) (holding that the standard of equity and good conscience also applies to a failure to
renew a contract). For other cases applying such a standard, see Morrisey v. Brocmal, 37
Neb. 295, 56 N.W. 383 (1893); Maddox Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 23 S.W.2d 333
(Tex. Com. App. 1930).
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drawn when a manufacturer terminates a price-cutting dealer
following competitors' complaints and specific instances of
dealer threats against the manufacturer. Also, in finding the
NAP to be a per se illegal price maintenance scheme led by
Michelin as a regulator of the horizontal competition, Bostick
raises implications for manufacturers and the degree of control
they may have over the policies of their dealers. More signifi-
cantly, Bostick interprets the South Carolina UTPA to cover
conduct that before might have been brought under the federal
antitrust laws. Since the UTPA does not require proof of a con-
spiracy, but rather only a showing of unfairness or anticompeti-
tive purposes, the effect will be to allow more plaintiffs to bring
antitrust actions without the difficult problem of showing a
conspiracy.
Suzanne C. Ebelein
IV. RECOVERY AND STACKING OF UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
COVERAGE
The South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted section 56-
9-83114 of the South Carolina Code for the first time in Gam-
brell v. Travelers Insurance Companies.147 The court addressed
two issues in Gambrell, the first of which concerned the ability
of a motorist to recover under an underinsured motorist provi-
sion when the insured's damages exceed the at-fault motorist's
liability coverage. Although the at-fault motorist's liability cov-
erage was of a greater amount than the insured victim's underin-
sured coverage, the court held that section 56-9-831 did allow
the insured plaintiff to recover the amount by which her dam-
ages exceeded the at-fault motorist's liability coverage, to the
146. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-831 (Supp. 1983) states in part:
Automobile insurance carriers shall offer, at the option of the insured, unin-
sured motorist coverage up to the limits of the insured's liability coverage in
addition to the mandatory coverage prescribed by § 56-9-830. Such carriers
shall also offer, at the option of the insured, underinsured motorist coverage up
to the limits of the insured's liability coverage to provide coverage in the event
that damages are sustained in excess of the liability limits carried by an at
fault insured or underinsured motorist.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-831 (Supp. 1983).
147. 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E.2d 814 (1983).
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extent of her underinsured motorist coverage. 14 8 The second is-
sue concerned the ability of a policyholder, assuming recovery
under section 56-9-831 in the first instance, to stack the under-
insured motorist coverage on her two vehicles. The court fol-
lowed its rationale in Kraft v. Hartford Insurance Co. 149 and
held that the plaintiff could stack underinsured motorist cover-
age because section 56-9-831150 specifically prohibits stacking in
only two situations, neither of which was applicable to Gam-
brell's case.""'
Linda Gambrell, the plaintiff, was seriously injured in a
head-on collision caused by the negligence of William Suttles
(the at-fault motorist). Suttles carried $50,000 of liability cover-
age which his insurer paid to Gambrell; 52 however, the plain-
tiff's damages exceeded this amount. Gambrell had purchased
$15,000 in underinsured motorist coverage for each of her two
vehicles, and brought a declaratory judgment action 5 3 to apply
this underinsured coverage to the deficiency in the settlement
with Suttles.
Gambrell defined an "underinsured" motorist as one who
lacks sufficient liability coverage to pay the total amount of
148. Id. at 70, 310 S.E.2d at 815.
149. 279 S.C. 257, 305 S.E.2d 243 (1983). The court in Kraft held that automobile
liability insurance could be stacked when an insured is driving a vehicle that he does not
own. For a survey of the Kraft opinion, see infra at pp. 30-39.
150. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-831 (Supp. 1983) provides in part-
If, however, an insured or named insured is protected by uninsured or underin-
sured motorist coverage in excess of the basic limits, the policy shall provide
that the insured ... is protected only to the extent of the coverage he has on
the vehicle involved in the accident. If none of the insured's . . . vehicles is
involved in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on
any one of the vehicles with the excess of underinsured coverage. Coverage on
any other vehicles shall not be added to that coverage.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-831 (Supp. 1983).
151. 280 S.C. at 73, 310 S.E.2d at 817.
152. Brief of Appellant at 2. Suttles' insurer paid Gambrell under a covenant not to
execute. Id.
153. Id. at iiii. The case was heard in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Pur-
suant to S.C. Sup. CT. R. 46, Gambrell was certified to the South Carolina Supreme
Court by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 280 S.C. at 70, 310 S.E.2d at 815. The
supreme court chose to answer the questions certified since they required interpretation
of a state statute for which there was no controlling precedent. These questions would be
determinative of the cause pending before the Fourth Circuit and therefore, through cer-
tification, a state court decision on the issue would carry "the same force and effect as
any other decision of the Supreme Court," S.C. Sup. CT. R. 46, which a Fourth Circuit
decision would not do.
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damages sustained. The insurer argued that in the absence of a
statutory definition, it was justified in defining "underinsured"
according to the policy term"M as "[a] motor vehicle with respect
to the ownership maintenance or use of which the sum of the
limit of liability under all bodily injury or property damage lia-
bility bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the
accident is less than the applicable limits under this insur-
ance. . ."15 Essentially, the insurance company asserted that
this meant that a motor vehicle is underinsured if the sum of the
limits of liability under all applicable insurance policies of the
at-fault motorist is less than the applicable limits under the in-
sured's policy. The insurer further contended that one of the
primary purposes of underinsured motorist coverage is to pro-
tect against out-of-state vehicles which do not carry the statu-
tory minimum coverage. 156 To determine which of these inter-
pretations of "underinsured" was intended by the legislature,
the court studied the language and purpose of section 56-9-831
and the differences between uninsured motorist coverage and
underinsured motorist coverage.15
7
The court recognized that it should apply general rules of
contract construction to an insurance contract and that it should
give the policy language its plain meaning."' However, when the
plain meaning seems to contradict a statute, the statute will pre-
vail.1 59 Considering the ordinary and popular significance of the
language, the court concluded that section 56-9-831 provides
154. Brief of Appellee at 6. Travelers also cited Willis v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of
N.Y., 253 S.C. 91, 169 S.E.2d 282 (1969) for the proposition that a voluntary contract for
insurance coverage which is not statutorily mandated allows the parties to choose their
terms.
155. 280 S.C. at 72 n.1, 310 S.E.2d at 816 n.1.
156. Id. at 72, 310 S.E.2d at 816.
157. The court stated the general rule for construction of a statute that "the legisla-
tive intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, which
must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the [s]tatutes." Id. at 71, 310
S.E.2d at 816 (quoting Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 394-95, 134 S.E.2d
206, 209 (1964)). The court in Laird interpreted part of the Uninsured Motorist Act to
determine the scope of liability of the defendant insurance company.
158. 280 S.C. at 71, 310 S.E.2d at 816. The court cited Sloan Constr. Co. v. Central
Nat'l Ins. Co., 269 S.C. 183, 236 S.E.2d 818 (1977) which held that insurance policies are
subject to the general rules of contract construction in a determination of whether the
plaintiff had a right to recover against defendant under his insurance policy. 267 S.C. at
185, 236 S.E.2d at 819.
159. See 280 S.C. at 71, 310 S.E.2d at 816-17.
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coverage when the injured party's damages exceed the liability
limits of the at-fault motorist.1 0 The statute contains the re-
striction that an insured may not carry a greater amount of un-
derinsured motorist coverage than he does liability coverage.
There is no requirement that the insured's underinsured cover-
age limits exceed the liability limits of the at-fault motorist.
Furthermore, since the statutory minimum for liability in-
surance in South Carolina is $15,00061 and, under section 56-9-
831, underinsured motorist coverage cannot exceed the limits of
the insured's liability coverage, underinsured motorist coverage,
accepting defendant's definition, would be rendered valueless in
some situations.16 2 According to the insurance company's defini-
tion, if the at-fault motorist had the statutory minimum liability
coverage of $15,000 and the insured had underinsured coverage
of $15,000, there would be no recovery even if the insured's dam-
ages were greater than $15,000. Therefore, uninsured coverage
would be worthless to an insured with minimum liability
coverage.
160. Id. at 70, 310 S.E.2d at 816. The insurance company also contended that the
provisions of its policy conformed to the definition of an "underinsured" motorist found
in a South Carolina administrative interpretation which read, "[B]y definition, an under-
insured vehicle is one which is insured but for a limit less than the underinsured limit
purchased by the Insured." S.C. Department of Insurance Interpretive Bulletin No. 78-6,
1948 S.C. Acts 569. The Insurance Commission compared liability limits of the at-fault
motorist to underinsured limits of the insured motorist. The court found that this inter-
pretation did not comport with the meaning of the statute stating, "This 'administrative
construction... affords no basis for the perpetration of a patently erroneous applica-
tion of the statute."' 280 S.C. at 72, 310 S.E.2d at 817 (quoting Monroe v. Livingston,
251 S.C. 214, 217, 161 S.E.2d 243, 244 (1968)).
161. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-820 (1976) sets the minimums at $15,000 for bodily in-
jury to or the death of one person in any one accident, $30,000 for bodily injury to or
death of two or more persons in any one accident, and $5000 for injury to or destruction
of property of others in any one accident.
162. 280 S.C. at 72, 310 S.E.2d at 817. This issue surfaced one year later in Garris v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 280 S.C. 149, 311 S.E.2d 723 (1984). The insurance company in Gar-
ris contended that underinsured motorist coverage applied only when the insured's un-
derinsured limits were greater than the at-fault motorist's liability coverage, because re-
covery under the insured's underinsured coverage is offset by the amount of recovery
from the at-fault motorist. Although Travelers raised this same argument in Gambrell,
see Brief of Appellee at 7, the supreme court never addressed the issue. The court in
Garris, however, made it clear that underinsured coverage was not meant to fill the gap
between the at-fault motorist's liability limits and the insured's underinsured limits. 280
S.C. at 154, 311 S.E.2d at 726. Since an offset is not allowed, the court concluded that
underinsured coverage in an amount less than or equal to the statutory minimum of
$15,000 would not be valueless. Id. at 154, 311 S.E.2d at 726.
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The court also rejected defendant's argument that underin-
sured coverage provided protection against out-of-state drivers
who do not satisfy the statutory minimum, noting that if this
were the case, there would be no need for uninsured motorist
insurance coverage, required by law in South Carolina. 1 3 The
purpose of requiring uninsured motorist coverage is to protect
an insured in case an at-fault driver has no liability coverage or
has less liability coverage than is statutorily required.164 The de-
fendant's definition of underinsured coverage would negate this
purpose since it is identical to the purpose of uninsured cover-
age. The legislature's differentiating between the two types of
coverage would be rendered senseless.
The South Carolina Code not only provides for underin-
sured motorist coverage, but also provides for additional, op-
tional, uninsured motorist coverage up to the limits of the in-
sured's liability coverage.16 5 Accepting the defendant's argument
would likewise negate this provision. It is doubtful that the leg-
islature would have provided in the same statute for both op-
tional uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage if they
were intended to accomplish the same purpose. It seems logical
that uninsured coverage covers damages not otherwise covered
because the at-fault motorist's liability coverage is less than the
amount statutorily required, and that underinsured coverage
covers damages not otherwise covered because the at-fault mo-
torist's liability coverage, although equal to or greater than the
amount statutorily required, is less than the damages the in-
jured party sustains. It also covers any damages beyond that
covered by the insured's uninsured coverage.
1 66
In Holman v. All Nation Insurance Co.,1 67 the Minnesota
Supreme Court discussed whether Lick v. Dairyland Insurance
163. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-830 (1976) states:
No such policy.. . shall be issued or delivered unless it contains a provision
by endorsement or otherwise, herein referred to as the uninsured motorist pro-
vision, undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally enti-
tled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle, within limits which shall be no less than the requirements of § 56-9-
820, as amended from time to time.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-830 (1976).
164. 280 S.C. at 72, 310 S.E.2d at 816.
165. See supra note 146.
166. 280 S.C. at 72, 310 S.E.2d at 816.
167. 288 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1980).
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Co. 16 1 operated to limit underinsured motorist coverage to the
amount by which the coverage exceeded the liability coverage of
the at-fault motorist. The court in Lick held that by purchasing
underinsured coverage an individual could ensure that, should
he be injured by one who carried liability insurance in an
amount less than the minimum required by statute, he would
have available to him the full amount required by the liability
statute.1 6 9 In a footnote, the court noted that this interpretation
would make underinsured coverage valueless in certain circum-
stances. However, in Minnesota underinsured coverage could ar-
guably apply to protect against out-of-state motorists who did
not meet Minnesota's statutory requirements,170 because Minne-
sota, unlike South Carolina, did not include having less insur-
ance than the statutory minimum within the statutory definition
of "uninsured."17'
By 1975, the Minnesota No Fault Act was in effect. This
Act required all motorists in Minnesota, including those from
out-of-state, to be protected by an insurance plan meeting mini-
mum requirements. A driver who did not carry such insurance
was "uninsured." '1 2 In effect, the No Fault Act definition of un-
insured motorist, combined with the Lick rule, nullified underin-
sured coverage when a driver, who carried underinsured motorist
coverage in an amount equal to the minimum liability coverage
required, was hit by another driver carrying the statutory mini-
mum or less. It was pointless even to offer underinsured motor-
ist coverage in an amount equal to minimum liability
coverage.
17 3
In response to this dilemma, the Minnesota legislature
amended the statute upon which the court in Lick had relied.
The amendment specified that his underinsured coverage enti-
tled an insured to recover uncompensated damages which oc-
curred when total damages exceeded the tortfeasor's liability
limits.17 4 Thus, for accidents occurring after the No Fault Act
168. 258 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977).
169. Id. at 793-94. This is referred to as the Lick rule in Holman, 288 N.W.2d at
250.
170. 258 N.W.2d at 794 n.3.
171. Id. at 794.
172. 288 N.W.2d at 250.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 250-51.
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became effective, the Lick rule was inapplicable. The plaintiff in
Holman was allowed to recover underinsured motorist benefits
in addition to bodily injury liability benefits to the extent of his
damages."
The situation in South Carolina may be analogized to that
in Holman even though the equivalent South Carolina statutes
are not within a No Fault Act, but are instead within the Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act.176 South Carolina's legisla-
ture has specifically mandated uninsured motorist coverage in
an amount at least equal to the statutory liability limits1 7" and
has also required insurers to offer underinsured motorist cover-
age, and the statutes should be interpreted with an assumption
that the drafters did not intend for these provisions to be purely
redundant. If uninsured coverage gives the insured the same
protection whether injured by an uninsured motorist or by a
tortfeasor with a standard liability policy,178 the only gap left for
underinsured coverage to fill is that between the liability limits
of the tortfeasor's policy and the injured party's damages.
As to the second issue in Gambrell, whether the plaintiff-
insured could stack the coverage she held on two automobiles,
the court noted that section 56-9-831 prohibits stacking in only
two situations, neither of which is applicable in Gambrell.179 The
first situation occurs when an insured carries underinsured mo-
torist coverage in excess of the basic limits. The court inter-
preted this to mean that an insured may stack any underinsured
motorist coverage up to, but not in excess of, the basic liability
limits on each automobile.180 The second situation occurs when
none of the insured's vehicles is involved in the accident. In this
case, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on any
one of the vehicles with the underinsured coverage. 81 "Coverage
on any other vehicles shall not be added to that coverage." 182
The court found this last sentence inapplicable when, as in
175. Id. at 251.
176. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-9-10 to -910 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
177. See supra note 160.
178. 7 AM. JuR.2D Automobile Insurance § 293 (1980). See also 243 S.C. at 392, 134
S.E.2d at 208, for an explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist insurance.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 149-51.
180. 280 S.C. at 73, 310 S.E.2d at 817.
181. Id.
182. Id. (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-831 (Supp. 1983)(emphasis omitted)).
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Gambrell, one of the insured's automobiles is involved in the ac-
cident at issue.
In Esler v. United Services Automobile Association,1as the
South Carolina Supreme Court stated, "The crucial test to be
applied in [determining whether stacking is permissible] is not
the number of policies issued but rather the number of addi-
tional coverages which were separately contracted and paid
for. 1 4 Here, Gambrell purchased underinsured coverage for her
two automobiles through one policy, but she paid a separate pre-
mium to obtain underinsured coverage on each automobile.
Thus, the court held she passed the test which entitled her to
stack her underinsured motorist coverage for the two vehicles. 185
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Gambrell clearly de-
lineated the differences between uninsured motorist coverage
and underinsured motorist coverage. Each serves a distinct pur-
pose; otherwise, both would not have been included within the
statute. When insurance companies provide underinsured mo-
torist coverage in the future, they should be aware that under
South Carolina Code section 56-9-831, they will be liable for any
damages in excess of the tortfeasor's liability coverage. The only
limitation is that underinsured coverage cannot exceed the in-
sured's own liability coverage. Also, plaintiffs may now stack this
underinsured coverage, or, in other words, may add together the
coverages they have procured with each of the premiums. This
mechanism will help plaintiffs collect all of the damages they are
awarded.
Suzanne C. Ebelein
V. STACKING OF NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE LIBIITY INSURANCE
On an issue of first impression,""' the South Carolina Su-
183. 273 S.C. 259, 255 S.E.2d 676 (1979).
184. Id. at 263, 255 S.E.2d at 679.
185. 280 S.C. at 74, 310 S.E.2d at 817. The court referred to Kraft, surveyed infra at
pp. 30-39, its recent stacking decision, as support for the Esler test. 280 S.C. at 74, 310
S.E.2d at 817. Gambrell, however, presents a stronger case for stacking than did Kraft
since there was no evidence in Kraft that additional premiums were paid for coverage of
additional non-owned vehicles. 279 S.C. at 259, 305 S.E.2d at 244-45.
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preme Court held in Kraft v. Hartford Insurance Co.1 8 7 that au-
tomobile liability insurance may be "stacked"1 when an in-
sured is driving a vehicle that he does not own.1" 9 Previous
decisions have discussed stacking in the contexts of medical in-
surance coverage and uninsured motorist coverage,190 but Kraft
is the first to allow stacking of non-owned 91 vehicle coverage.
The decision seems to conflict with similar decisions in other ju-
risdictions1 92 and with a Fourth Circuit opinion on the same
subject.19 3 The court based its decision on policy reasons it
thought were strong enough to allow, in effect, double coverage
for the plaintiff.
While riding his motorcycle, George Kraft, the plaintiff-re-
spondent, was struck by a vehicle driven by Thomas Geathers
and owned by his brother, Richard Geathers. The driver was in-
sured under an automobile liability insurance policy issued by
Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford), the appellant. The
driver's insurance policy covered two vehicles, each carrying the
minimum coverage of $15,000 for bodily injury to or death of
one person. 1 9 The premiums for each vehicle's liability coverage
187. 279 S.C. 257, 305 S.E.2d 243 (1983).
188. "Stacking" has been defined as a determination of the amount of insurance
coverage by "multiplying the face limits of a policy by the number of vehicles insured
thereunder to arrive at a higher limit of recovery." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bair, 257
S.C. 551, 554 n.1, 186 S.E.2d 410, 411 n.1 (1972). Stacking may also refer to recovery
allowed under two separate insurance policies. See Esler v. United Services Auto. Ass'n,
273 S.C. 259, 263, 255 S.E.2d 676, 679 (1979).
189. 279 S.C. at 258, 305 S.E.2d at 244.
190. See Esler v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 273 S.C. 259, 255 S.E.2d 676
(1979)(stacking of additional personal injury protection benefits under a multiple vehicle
policy allowed); Boyd v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 260 S.C. 316, 195 S.E.2d 706
(1973)(stacking of uninsured motorist coverage required when two separate policies are
concerned); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bair, 257 S.C. 551, 186 S.E.2d 410 (1972)(stack-
ing of uninsured motorist limits and medical benefits under a multiple vehicle policy not
required).
191. Non-owned vehicle liability coverage insures a policy holder for any liability he
may incur while driving a vehicle that he does not own.
192. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mole, 414 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1969)(under Florida law,
stacking of non-owned vehicle coverage not allowed); Otto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2 Ill.
App.3d 58, 275 N.E.2d 766 (111. App. Ct. 1971)(one insurance policy containing two sepa-
rate certificates of insurance not interpreted as two separate policies allowing double
recovery); Am. Liberty Ins. Co. v. Ranzau, 481 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1972)(stacking of non-
owned automobile protection not allowed when there is no additional payment for each
automobile covered under the policy).
193. See Emick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 519 F.2d 1317 (4th Cir. 1975).
194. These minimum levels of coverage are set out in the Code as "Bodily injury
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were separately itemized in the insurance policy. 1 5
Kraft sought $30,000 from Hartford, aggregating the mini-
mum coverages of both insured vehicles. Hartford refused to pay
more than $15,000, the amount of coverage for one automobile.
Kraft then brought this declaratory judgment action"" to re-
solve the question of whether the minimum coverages on two
insured automobiles may be added, or "stacked," when the in-
sured was driving a vehicle which he did not own.
1 9 7
The trial court granted Kraft's motion for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that section 56-9-820 of the South Carolina
Code 98 applies to liability coverage for the operation of non-
owned vehicles, and that this coverage is afforded separately to
each vehicle insured. Consequently, limitations on stacking lia-
bility coverage are in derogation of the statute and cannot be
allowed. 10 9 Hartford appealed this decision.
Both parties conceded that an insured who contracts and
pays for double coverage should receive it. 200 Hartford claimed
that Geathers contracted and paid for only single coverage for
his non-owned automobile liability protection and therefore was
not entitled to receive coverage for both automobiles listed in
the policy. 20 1 Hartford introduced an affidavit of one of its per-
and property damage limits; general requirements."
No policy. . . of bodily injury liability insurance or of property damage liabil-
ity insurance, covering liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or
use of any motor vehicle, shall be issued. . unless it contains a provision
insuring the persons defined as insured, against loss from the liability imposed
by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such
motor vehicles . . . subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, with re-
spect to each motor vehicle, as follows: fifteen thousand dollars because of bod-
ily injury to or death of one person in any one accident, and ... thirty thou-
sand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any
one accident, and five thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction of
property of others in any one accident.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-820 (1976).
195. Record at 41.
196. This action was brought pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-53-10 to -140 (1976).
197. 279 S.C. at 258, 305 S.E.2d at 244.
198. For text of S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-820, see supra note 194.
199. Record at 46-47. It is interesting to note that the South Carolina Supreme
Court did not discuss the grounds upon which the trial court decision rested; however,
the court reached the same result by different reasoning.
200. 279 S.C. at 258, 305 S.E.2d at 244.
201. Id.
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sonal lines managers20 2 that the policy provided the insured with
coverage while driving a non-owned vehicle regardless of how
many vehicles were named in the policy; the insured would pay
no additional premium for non-owned vehicle coverage, even
though more vehicles were added to the policy.
The supreme court found that an insurer is not required by
the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act0 3 to offer non-
owned vehicle coverage, and therefore, the parties may contract
as they see fit.204 The court then analyzed the relevant portions
of Geathers' policy to determine whether it provided non-owned
vehicle coverage on each automobile covered by the policy. Sec-
tion I of the policy, the "Liability" portion, provided that "the
insurer agrees to pay ... all sums the insured is legally obli-
gated to pay as damages which arise out of the ownership, main-
tenance, or use of the owned automobile or any non-owned auto-
mobile. '205 The "conditions" portion of the policy stated:
Two or more automobiles-Section I, I1 and IV: When two or
more automobiles are insured hereunder, the terms of this pol-
icy shall apply separately to each ....
This is commonly known as a "separability clause.
'207
The court construed the separability clause to treat each ve-
hicle as if it were insured on a separate policy with respect to
the liability, medical payments, and physical damages sections
(Sections I, H and IV). The court reasoned that stacking would
not be denied if the vehicles were listed on separate policies,
202. For the complete affidavit, see Record at 21.
203. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 56-9-10 to -910 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
204. 279 S.C. at 258, 305 S.E.2d at 244. The court cited Willis v. Fidelity and Casu-
alty Co., 253 S.C. 91, 169 S.E.2d 282 (1969), in support of this proposition. The Willis
decision also discussed non-owned automobile liability coverage, although in a different
context than Kraft. In Willis the automobile involved in the accident was owned by a
member of insured's household, but was excluded from insured's non-owned automobile
liability coverage. The court held that the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (now
the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act) required coverage for an insured only
while operating an insured vehicle; the provision of an automobile liability policy exclud-
ing coverage of an insured while driving an automobile not listed in the policy but owned
by the named insured or a member of the same household did not conflict with the Act
and was a valid voluntary contract. 253 S.C. at 96-97, 169 S.E.2d at 284-85.
205. 279 S.C. at 259, 305 S.E.2d at 244.
206. Id.
207. Id. See also Emick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 519 F.2d 1317, 1320 (4th Cir. 1975).
The entire insurance policy at issue in Kraft is set out in the Record at 5-18.
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even if with different insurance companies, and both policies
carried non-owned vehicle coverage. Therefore, it would be an
artificial construction to refuse stacking merely because two or
more cars were listed on one policy. 0 8 Interpreting the policy
liberally in favor of the insured, the court commented that if the
insurer did not intend for the non-owned coverage to apply sep-
arately to each automobile, it could have included a clause simi-
lar to the language in the affidavit.209
The opinion summarily disposed of Hartford's argument
that Geathers paid no additional premiums for coverage of non-
owned automobiles when additional cars were added to the pol-
icy. The court found this to be of "little significance"2 10 since
neither the insurance policy nor the affidavit indicated that the
insured paid any premium for non-owned vehicle coverage. In-
stead, the court reasoned that non-owned vehicle coverage could
have been offered gratuitously or as a built-in component of iha-
bility coverage already included in the premium.
211
The South Carolina Supreme Court has discussed the stack-
ing issue in contexts other than non-owned vehicle liability cov-
erage. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bair21 2 held that
section 46-750.33 of the 1962 South Carolina Code213 did not re-
quire the stacking of uninsured motorist endorsement limits
when two vehicles were insured under one policy.2 1 4 The court
determined that the phrase "with respect to each motor vehicle"
in section 46-750.32215 did not require that the minimum limits
203. 279 S.C. at 259-60, 305 S.E.2d at 245. See also Brief of Respondent at 6.
209. 279 S.C. at 259, 305 S.E.2d at 244-45.
210. Id., 305 S.E.2d at 245.
211. Id.
212. 257 S.C. 551, 186 S.E.2d 410 (1972).
213. The equivalent section in the 1976 Code reads in part:
No such policy or contract shall be issued or delivered unless it contains a
provision... herein referred to as the uninsured motorist provision, undertak-
ing to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as
damages from the owner as operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, within lim-
its which shall be no less than the requirements of § 56-9-820....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-830 (1976).
214. 257 S.C. at 555, 186 S.E.2d at 412. The court also held that "under the policy's
plain and unambiguous provisions," id. at 557, 186 S.E.2d at 413, stacking of medical
payments was not required. Id. at 556-57, 186 S.E.2d at 412-13. The court distinguished
Bair from decisions in other jurisdictions that have allowed stacking of medical pay-
ments when the policy provisions were ambiguous. Id. at 557, 186 S.E.2d at 413.
215. For text of the equivalent section in the 1976 Code, see supra note 194.
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for liability coverage apply separately to vehicles covered under
one policy. Rather, it defined the scope of the policy, assuring
that the minimum limits apply to any one of the vehicles cov-
ered.210 Since the uninsured motorist section required the same
minimum as section 46-750.32, the court concluded that its in-
terpretation of section 46-750.32 applied also to section 46-
750.33.217
On the other hand, Boyd v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. '1 8 allowed double recovery of uninsured motorist
benefits under two separate liability insurance policies." The
court invalidated an "other insurance" clause in the policies
which purported to limit the insurer's liability to $8,000 per pol-
icy. The clause, stated the court, was inconsistent with the
$10,000 minimum coverage mandated by section 46-750.32.22o
The court concluded that "the obligation of the insurer under
the terms of the statute is to pay plaintiff all sums which he is
legally entitled to recover from the tortfeasor up to the limit of
insurance provided by both policies."22 '
The most recent pre-Kraft decision in South Carolina is Es-
ler v. United Services Automobile Association.222 Similarly to
Kraft, the insured in Esler had one automobile policy that cov-
ered two automobiles and provided additional personal injury
protection (APIP) in the amount of $2,500 per car. The court
held that stacking of APIP benefits was permitted under the au-
thority of Belk v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,223 which
allowed an insured to recover APIP benefits from two policies
when two premiums were paid.224 The court in Esler did not
make a distinction between the case in which two cars are cov-
ered under one policy and the situation in which two cars are
covered under separate policies, stating, "The crucial test to be
216. 257 S.C. at 554, 186 S.E.2d at 411. The trial court in Kraft held that the statute
applies separately to each vehicle insured. Since the supreme court held that the statute
did not mandate non-owned vehicle coverage, it never reached this issue.
217. 257 S.C. at 554, 186 S.E.2d at 411.
218. 260 S.C. 316, 195 S.E.2d 706 (1973).
219. Id. at 321, 195 S.E.2d at 708.
220. Id. at 319-20, 195 S.E.2d at 707. The equivalent section of the 1976 Code is §
56-9-820. This statute now requires minimum coverage of $15,000. See supra note 194.
221. 260 S.C. at 321, 195 S.E.2d at 708 (emphasis in original).
222. 273 S.C. 259, 255 S.E.2d 676 (1979).
223. 271 S.C. 24, 244 S.E.2d 744 (1978).
224. 273 S.C. at 263, 255 S.E.2d at 679.
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applied in situations such as the present one is not the number
of policies issued but rather the number of additional coverages
which were separately contracted and paid for. 2 25 Esler there-
fore indicates that the controlling principle in the stacking cases
is to allow the insured the "benefit of his bargain"22' 6 when mul-
tiple premiums have been paid for multiple coverage.
In Kraft, the plaintiff and the trial court relied upon Boyd
and Esler to permit stacking. 27 The defendant tried to distin-
guish Boyd and Esler on the basis that the insured parties in
those cases paid double premiums for the type of coverage in
dispute and were therefore entitled to the coverage for which
they paid.22 18 Defendant also argued that the decision in Boyd
was consistent with the majority rule which allowed stacking of
uninsured motorist insurance only when a double premium has
been paid.229 The court in Kraft negated these arguments by
stating that lack of payment of double premiums was insignifi-
cant. The fact that the insurer drafted the policy with a separa-
bility clause and failed to clarify the ambiguity surrounding pre-
mium payments for non-owned vehicle coverage was
determinative.
In analyzing the Kraft decision, reliance on Boyd and Esler
may be misguided. Uninsured motorist coverage and medical
payments have been distinguished from non-owned vehicle cov-
erage by a number of courts which have held to the contrary of
Kraft on the issue of stacking non-owned vehicle coverage.
2 30
The Fourth Circuit case Emick v. Dairyland Insurance Co. 231
clearly demonstrates that the underlying principles allowing
stacking of uninsured motorist coverage and medical payments
cannot be the basis for stacking non-owned vehicle coverage.
Emick, like Kraft, concerned the stacking of non-owned vehicle
liability coverage when a policy contained both a "Liability"
225. Id., 255 S.E.2d at 679 (emphasis added).
226. Id., 255 S.E.2d at 679.
227. Brief of Appellant at 12.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mole, 414 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1969); Government Em-
ployees Ins. Co. v. Sweet, 186 So.2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Bellars, 462 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 1970); Rosar v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 41 Wis.2d 95, 163
N.W.2d 129 (1968).
231. 519 F.2d 1317 (4th Cir. 1975).
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clause and a "Separability" clause. It is interesting to note that
the court in Emick used arguments almost identical to those
later used by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Kraft to
reach the opposite result. 32 Recognizing that the combination of
a liability clause and a separability clause may create ambiguity,
the court in Emick focused on the fact that separate premiums
are generally assessed for medical payment and uninsured mo-
torist coverage. 3 Since there was no proof in Emick that the
insured paid a specific premium for non-owned vehicle liability
coverage for each car, there was no justification for resolving the
ambiguity in favor of stacking the coverage. 3 4 Without proof of
such payments, the Fourth Circuit refused to presume that a
double premium was charged and paid. It further reasoned that
the nature of non-owned automobile liability coverage precluded
such a presumption, stating, "[T]here is no rational nexus be-
tween this coverage and the number of owned vehicles listed in
the policy.... 25
The court further reasoned that even if separate policies
had been written for each vehicle, the insured still could not
have recovered the amounts for each car.2"6 In distinguishing
medical payments and uninsured motorist coverage from non-
owned vehicle liability coverage, the court characterized the for-
mer types of coverage as broad "first party" coverages "closely
232. The plaintiff in Kraft argued that the district court opinion in Emick, 389 F.
Supp. 1025 (W.D. Va. 1974), overturned by the Fourth Circuit, is "more consonant with
the South Carolina Rule as propounded in Esler." Brief for Respondent at 4, Kraft. The
district court in Emick held that when an insurance company charges a separate and
equal amount for non-owned vehicle liability coverage for each vehicle listed in the pol-
icy, the combination of a liability clause and a separability clause creates an ambiguity
that must be strictly construed against the insurance company, thereby requiring that
the otherwise separate limits of bodily injury liability on each vehicle be stacked. 519
F.2d at 1320.
The district court listed two criteria in determining whether stacking should be ap-
plied: (1) the presence of a liability and a separability clause; and (2) the payment of a
separate premium. 389 F. Supp. at 1031. The circuit court found neither of these to be
present on the facts of Emick. See infra notes 233-40 and accompanying text.
233. 519 F.2d at 1323.
234. Id. at 1324. The circuit court noted that the policy did not indicate whether
any portion of the premiums was attributable to non-owned vehicle liability coverage
and there was no evidence that insured paid twice for this coverage. Id. Furthermore, the
court noted, as did the supreme court in Kraft, that this coverage could have been of-
fered gratuitously to promote insurer's policies. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1325.
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akin to personal accident policies. ' 237 Medical and uninsured
motorist insurance coverages focus on the person of the insured,
regardless of the number of cars he owns and regardless of liabil-
ity on his part. It has a "floating" character and
has led courts to ignore the fact that these coverages have been
engrafted onto liability policies insuring particular cars, and to
hold that where double premiums have been paid, whether
under a single policy covering more than one automobile, or
whether under separate and independent policies, double cov-
erage has been purchased and stacking will be allowed .... 138
On the other hand, non-owned vehicle liability coverage
merely insures the policy holder against any liability the insured
may incur while driving a non-owned vehicle. Bodily injury lia-
bility coverage and its attendant limits attach to whichever au-
tomobile the insured happens to be driving, and such coverage
may not be stacked.239 Therefore, a separability clause does not
create an ambiguity with regard to bodily injury liability cover-
age. It merely assures that the policy applies to each car covered
under the policy.
240
The Fourth Circuit and other courts have considered the
payment of additional premiums for additional coverage to be a
crucial factor in allowing stacking.241 Also significant are the in-
herent differences between medical or uninsured motorist cover-
ages and non-owned vehicle liability coverage.242 Apparently the
court in Kraft did not allow either of these factors to affect its
decision. The court construed the policy strictly against the in-
surer on the grounds that the separability clause made the pol-
icy ambiguous.
By failing to take into account the issue of additional pre-
mium payments for the coverage in question, Kraft deviates
from Esler and the majority rule.243 In addition, the majority of
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1325-26.
239. Id. at 1326.
240. Id. See also Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson, 56 Wash.2d 715, 355 P.2d 12
(1960).
241. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 230.
243. Although the majority rule allows stacking when the insured purchases double
premiums, many courts have found it difficult to allocate the amount of the premium
paid for each vehicle in a multiple vehicle policy to the types of coverage provided. See
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courts have rejected the contention made in Kraft that a separa-
bility clause creates an ambiguity with regard to bodily injury
liability coverage.244 Although separability clauses have been
construed to create two separate policies in the context of unin-
sured motorist coverage and medical payments,245 no court prior
to Kraft has held that the clause creates two separate policies of
non-owned vehicle liability insurance.
24
1
Furthermore, the Bair decision indicates that South Caro-
lina aligns itself with the majority rule regarding stacking of lia-
bility limits. The court's construction in Bair of the language of
section 56-9-820 of the South Carolina Code does not require the
statutory liability limits to apply to each vehicle listed in a pol-
icy. This statutory language is analogous to the separability
clause found in Kraft. Bair may have alluded to the distinction
between liability coverage and uninsured motorist coverage or
medical payments when the court stated, "The defendants have
not suggested that cumulation, or 'stacking,' of policy limits is
required by statute where liability coverage is concerned.
241 7
In summary, insureds in South Carolina may now stack
their insurance coverage when a non-owned vehicle coverage
clause is present in the policy. The insured does not have to pay
an additional premium to obtain this result, but merely needs to
insure additional vehicles under the policy. Insurers may, how-
ever, avoid this result by expressly providing that a separability
clause does not affect insurer's liability limits.
Suzanne C. Ebelein
Bogart v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 473 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1973); Otto v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
2 Ill. App.3d 58, 275 N.E.2d 766 (I11. App. Ct. 1971); Am. Liberty Ins. Co. v. Ranzau, 481
S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1972). These courts have expressly rejected the presumption that pre-
mium payments for additional vehicles include an additional payment for each type of
coverage. This may be the underlying distinction between Bair and Boyd. See supra
notes 212-21 and accompanying text.
244. See Emick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 519 F.2d 1317 (4th Cir. 1975); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Mole, 414 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1969); Rosar v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 41 Wis.2d 95, 163
N.W.2d 129 (1968). These courts have noted a distinction between medical payments or
uninsured coverage and non-owned coverage. See also supra notes 237-40 and accompa-
nying text.
245. See Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Sweet, 186 So.2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966);
Southwestern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Atkins, 346 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Cent.
Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Elder, 204 Va. 192, 129 S.E.2d 651 (1963).
246. Emick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 519 F.2d 1317, 1327 (4th Cir. 1975).
247. 257 S.C. at 554, 186 S.E.2d at 411.
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VI. NON-PAYMENT OF MERIT RATING SURCHARGE PREMIUMS
BILLED AFTER RENEWAL PREMIUM PAID MAY NOT PROVIDE
GROUNDS FOR MID-TERM POLICY CANCELLATION
In Anderson v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Insurance
Co. 248 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a surcharge,
based on the South Carolina Merit Rating Plan 249 and billed to
the insured after the renewal premium had been paid, was an
attempted contract modification.25 0 The court further held that
since the additional premium was not a part of the contract, the
insured's failure to pay did not give the insurance company
grounds to cancel the policy in mid-term. 51
Prior to the expiration date of her then current policy, Mrs.
Allie Anderson received a renewal policy premium from Penn-
sylvania National. The notice, dated January 19, 1978, showed a
total premium of $653 for the renewal period of February 28,
1978 through February 27, 1979. On or before the due date, Mrs.
Anderson went to the office of her local agent, where she made a
cash down payment and arranged to finance the balance of the
premium with Interstate Finance Company.252
On February 27, 1978, Pennsylvania National sent Mrs. An-
derson a surcharge premium based on driving violations charged
to her son, a permissive driver under the policy, during the
thirty-six months prior to the policy renewal date. 53 Mrs. An-
derson never paid this premium and the policy was cancelled on
December 15, 1978.254
248. 279 S.C. 304, 306 S.E.2d 597 (1983).
249. Ins. Dep't Reg., S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & REG.) 69-13.1 (1976 & Supp. 1983). In-
surance regulations are authorized by S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-37-1490 (1976).
250. 279 S.C. at 305, 306 S.E.2d at 598.
251. Id. at 306, 306 S.E.2d at 598.
252. Record at 33, 52 & 65. The exact date on which Mrs. Anderson went to her
agent is unclear.
253. Id. at 73. Apparently, there was no issue of misrepresentation. The surcharge of
$241.00 was based on information the company obtained from the Highway Department.
See id. at 39. The absence of any reference in the record to a renewal application or
misrepresentation supports the author's assumption that Mrs. Anderson never made any
pre.renewal representations concerning her son's driving record. See Record.
254. Id. at 42. In fact, the agent advanced the surcharge premium to Mrs. Anderson
in March by remitting the amount due to the company. He testified that he made re-
peated efforts to collect, but finally decided he had no choice but to cancel. The cancella-
tion notice was mailed November 28, 1978. The mailing was certified by a post office
receipt, but no return receipt was requested. Id. at 48. Mrs. Anderson denied receiving
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Mrs. Anderson's son was involved in an automobile accident
in North Carolina on January 14, 1979, in which the insured ve-
hicle was destroyed. The insurance company refused to pay the
claim which Mrs. Anderson filed under the policy.2 5 Mrs. An-
derson then filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Ander-
son County, and the jury returned a verdict in her favor. Penn-
sylvania National appealed.256
The issue on appeal was whether a surcharge under the
South Carolina Merit Rating Plan 7 (the "Plan") was an ele-
ment of the original contract or a "modification thereafter at-
tempted. ' 258 Pennsylvania National insisted that "the surcharge
could be levied at anytime" 259 because the "Plan" was "incorpo-
rated into every insurance policy."260 The company argued that
the language of Regulation 69-13.1261 suggested that an endorse-
ment reflecting prior term charges was allowed. The court dis-
agreed, finding "no authority or public policy to support ...
[the insurance company's] reading of the . . . [regulation]. 26 2
The court, citing Howard v. American Southern Insurance
Co.,26 3 concluded that the record amply supported the trial
court's decision to treat the endorsement as an attempted modi-
fication. Since the evidence showed that the insured had re-
jected the offer of modification, the court reasoned that the in-
sured had no obligation to pay and the insurance company no
right to cancel.2
64
In Howard, a Georgia Court of Appeals decision, the insured
submitted an application stating that he had no violations dur-
ing the prior thirty-six month period. The insured's State of
the cancellation notice. Id. at 18.
255. Id. at 10-12.
256. 279 S.C. at 304, 306 S.E.2d at 597; Brief of Appellant at 1-2.
257. Ins. Dep't Reg., S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & RaG.) 69-13.1 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
258. 279 S.C. at 305, 306 S.E.2d at 597. On appeal, Pennsylvania National also ar-
gued that because the bill was issued prior to renewal, it was not a modification. This
argument was not considered, however, since it was not raised at trial. See id. at 305, 306
S.E.2d at 598.
259. Id. at 305, 306 S.E.2d at 598.
260. Brief of Appellant at 17.
261. That regulation reads in part, "[N]o policy shall be endorsed to reflect any
mid-term change in the driving records of the operators covered by the policy." Ins.
Dep't. Reg., S.C. CoDE ANN. (R. & REG.) 69-13.1 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
262. 279 S.C. at 306, 306 S.E.2d 598.
263. 148 Ga. App. 25, 251 S.E.2d 7 (1978), petition for cert. filed.
264. 279 S.C. at 306, 306 S.E.2d at 598.
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Georgia driving records, however, showed otherwise.265 The in-
surance company discovered the discrepancy after issuing the
policy and billed the insured to cover the additional risk. The
insured never paid and the company cancelled the policy. The
Georgia court held the additional premium to be an unbinding
attempt to modify the contract, which was rejected by the in-
sured. Since the insured was not in arrears on his original pre-
mium payments, the insurance company could not cancel. 6
While factually similar to Howard, Anderson can be distin-
guished because Mrs. Anderson did not make any representa-
tions concerning her son's driving record when she renewed the
policy.2
67
There is clearly a statutory right to cancel automobile insur-
ance policies in mid-term for failure to pay the premiums.268 It is
equally clear that the South Carolina Merit Rating Plan allows
an insurance company to charge an additional premium based
on driving violations of listed drivers during either the thirty-six
months prior to the policy inception date, or at the insurer's op-
tion, during the thirty-three months preceding the determina-
tive date, i.e., three months prior to the renewal date.269 The
Regulation is silent, however, concerning when the insurance
company is permitted to bill for these surcharges.
265. The court's opinion in Howard fails to reveal whether the insured misrepre-
sented his driving record on the application or if the state's records were in error. 148
Ga. App. at 26, 251 S.E.2d at 8.
266. Id. The court in Howard concluded that the additional risk assumed by the
company was not sufficient consideration for the additional premium requested. See id.
Cf. Turner v. Worth Ins. Co., 11 Ariz. App. 403, 406, 464 P.2d 990, 993, vacated on other
grounds, 106 Ariz. 132, 472 P.2d 1 (1970). The court determined that the insured's fail-
ure to list all violations on his application prevented a meeting of the minds as to the
contract terms.
267. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
268. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-37-1310(1), -1440(1) (1976). Section 38-37-1310 prohibits
mid-term cancellation except for reasons specified in the statute. Subsection (1) allows
cancellation if "[t]he named insured fails to discharge when due any of his obligations in
connection with the payment of premium for [the] policy or any installment
thereof ... " Section 38-37-1440 prohibits policy cancellation except for one of two rea-
sons, the first being "nonpayment of premium." Section 38-37-1410(4) defines
"[n]onpayment of premium" to include failure to pay a policy obligation whether the
premium is payable directly to the company or "its agent" or indirectly under any
premium finance plan (emphasis added). It is clear from these provisions that had the
surcharge been part of the original premium, cancellation for nonpayment would have
been allowed.
269. Ins. Dep't. Reg., S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & REG.) 69-13.1 (1976 & Supp. 1983).
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In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Mackey2 70 and
Gallmon v. American Employers Insurance Co.,271 the South
Carolina Supreme Court permitted policy cancellations for non-
payment of premiums charged after policy issuance.272 Both
cases are factually similar to Howard in that representations
were made by the insured in each.
In Mackey the insured was quoted a premium, made a
downpayment, and financed the balance, after completing an ap-
plication stating "that there were no violations against either of
the operators of the insured vehicle. '2 73 The application was as-
signed to the insurance company, which, during its customary
review process, obtained a Highway Department report
"show[ing] an offense of 'driving uninsured"' by Mrs. Mackey's
son.274 The insurance company issued the policy and billed the
insured for an additional amount based on that offense. The
premium was not paid because Mrs. Mackey insisted that the
report was wrong. Although the report was indeed wrong, Mrs.
Mackey produced no evidence of that until the policy had been
cancelled.. The issue in Mackey was whether the insurance com-
pany had a right to rely upon the Highway Department records.
The court held that the records supplied prima facie evidence of
offenses and that the company had a right "to rely thereon in
the absence of any contrary showing by the insured. '27 5
In Gallmon, the insurance company, after renewing the pol-
icy, discovered that Highway Department records showed that a
permissive male driver was only twenty-four years old. The re-
newal premium was based on his being twenty-five. Because of
the increased risk, the company billed the insured for an addi-
tional premium. The driver was, in fact, twenty-five. The in-
sured refused to pay the additional premiums and the policy was
cancelled. The court held that Mackey controlled and allowed
the cancellation.270
Although apparently not presented in Mackey or Gallmon,
270. 260 S.C. 306, 195 S.E.2d 830 (1973).
271. 272 S.C. 369, 252 S.E.2d 124 (1979).
272. 260 S.C. at 313-14, 195 S.E.2d at 833; 272 S.C. at 372-73, 252 S.E.2d at 125.
273. 260 S.C. at 310, 195 S.E.2d at 831.
274. Id. at 311, 195 S.E.2d at 832.
275. Id. at 315, 195 S.E.2d at 834. Pennsylvania National relied heavily on these
decisions. See Brief of Appellant at 13-15.
276. 272 S.C. at 373, 252 S.E.2d at 125.
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the contract modification argument is likely to be made when
similar fact patterns occur in the future. This argument is par-
ticularly useful if the court's public policy goal is to maintain
liability insurance on the maximum number of cars.
In Howard the Court of Appeals of Georgia failed to specify
whether the Georgia driving records or the insured provided the
correct information. However, as in Mackey and GaIlmon, the
insured was the source of the information upon which the origi-
nal premium was based. When erroneous information is pro-
vided by the insured, the company should have the right to ad-
just the premium. If the Georgia driving records were correct,
the contract modification analysis was not appropriate. The
company was not modifying. It was correcting the assumptions
upon which the premium was calculated. If the insured provided
false or misleading data, the case is one of misrepresentation,
and the insurer should have the right to cancel or to adjust the
premium to reflect the true risk for which it contracted. If the
277. See supra note 265.
278. Section 38-37-1310(2) allows cancellation if "[tihe insurance was obtained
through material misrepresentation ...... This provision appears to permit cancellation
of the policy without consideration of the nonpayment issue. However, this section is
part of Article 17 which contains 1964, 1965 and 1966 provisions. It may be superseded
by § 38-37-1440, a 1970 provision, to the extent the two conflict. Section 38-37-1440 per-
mits cancellation in only two situations, neither of which is misrepresentation. See supra
note 268 and accompanying text.
If § 38-37-1310(2) is still effective, an insurer can cancel for any material misrepre-
sentation, whether fraudulently made or not. If the statute has been overruled, South
Carolina case law allows an insurer to rescind an insurance contract for misstatements by
the insured in two circumstances. First, if the statements were representations, the com-
pany must show that the statements were untrue and that the falsity was known to the
insured, "that they were material to the risk, and relied on by the insurer, and that they
were made with the intent to mislead and defraud the insurer." Gov't Employees Ins. Co.
v. Chavis, 254 S.C. 507, 513, 176 S.E.2d 131, 134 (1970). Second, if the misstatement is a
warranty, the proof of its untruth is an express breach of contract "regardless of the
good faith and honest purpose of the insured ...... Kizer v. Woodmen of the World, 177
S.C. 70, 78, 180 S.E. 804, 807 (1935). See, e.g., Home Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Tisdale,
303 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1962). "A warranty. . . is a statement, description, or under-
taking on the part of the insured, appearing in the policy of insurance or in another
instrument properly incorporated in the policy, relating contractually to the risk insured
against." Reid v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 252 S.C. 339, 346, 166 S.E.2d 317, 321 (1969)
(emphasis added).
Whether a statement is a representation or a warranty depends on the contract lan-
guage and the intent of the parties. Kizer, 177 S.C. at 77, 180 S.E. at 807. See generally 7
COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 2D §§ 35.108-35.131 (rev. ed. 1961 & Supp. 1983);
7 BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 301.4 (3d ed. 1966); 12A APPLEm, IN-
SURANCE LAW AND PRACTIcE §§ 7291-7360 (1981). If applications are made warranties, the
44
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol36/iss1/4
BusiNESS AND INSURANCE LAW
records were wrong, as in Mackey and Gallmon, the charge of an
additional premium without any additional risk could easily be
characterized as an attempt to modify the original contract.
Thus, the insured would have no obligation to pay and cancella-
tion should be prohibited.
Treating a merit rating plan surcharge as a contract modifi-
cation makes sense in limited factual situations like that in An-
derson. Pennsylvania National knew about the surcharge viola-
tions by January 10th.2 79  Yet, they did not include the
additional amount in the January 19th renewal notice. Mrs. An-
derson did not misrepresent her son's driving record or deny the
violations. She merely alleged that the company had no right to
change the contract terms once she had accepted them. There is
no reason to allow an insurance company to bill less at renewal
when it is going to bill more later.
The flaw in this line of reasoning is that it renders the
thirty-six month period of the Regulation meaningless. If an in-
surance company has the right to base the Merit Rating
Surcharge on violations occurring up to the policy date, it is logi-
cal to assume that it will wait to check for last minute violations
before sending out the surcharge premium notice. 80 Obviously,
these records will never be available before the policy is issued.
After Anderson, insurance companies that want to collect merit
rating plan premiums have several choices. They may renew first
and bill the "whole" premium later, use the alternative thirty-
three month period, or issue the policy pursuant to an agree-
ment with the insured that the premium is subject to adjust-
ment upon receipt of a Highway Department report. 81
The real significance of Anderson will be determined by
subsequent cases. Read narrowly, it may be applied only in situ-
ations when the insurer is aware of chargeable violations and un-
necessarily delays billing. Read more broadly, any endorsement
insurer can void the policy for misstatements regardless of fraudulent intent or material-
ity. It can then offer to issue another policy under terms commensurate with the risk
involved.
279. Record at 46-47.
280. In fact, Pennsylvania National seemed to be trying to do just this. See Record
at 39.
281. The trial court's principle objection seemed to be that Mrs. Anderson was una-
ware that an additional premium might be charged and hence was deprived of an oppor-
tunity to fairly negotiate the terms of the contract. See Record at 51-56.
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billed after the original premium might be held to be an ineffec-
tive attempt to modify the contract and hence not grounds for
cancellation if unpaid. Because the South Carolina Supreme
Court seems determined to maintain continuous insurance cov-
erage on all vehicles licensed in the state, a broad reading should
be anticipated.
Elizabeth Bowe Anders
VII. AUTOMOBILE DEALERS' FAILURE TO OBTAIN CREDIBLE
INSURANCE INFORMATION FROM BUYERS MAY PREVENT TRANSFER
OF OWNERSHIP
In American Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Southland Mo-
tors Inc.,282 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that an au-
tomobile dealership retained, for insurance purposes, ownership
of a new car which had been "sold" and delivered to a buyer
who failed to obtain liability insurance.28 3 A provision of a ga-
rage liability policy purporting to exclude coverage "with respect
to any automobile. . . possession of which had been transferred
to another . . .pursuant to an agreement of sale"284 was held
ineffective because it contradicted South Carolina's statutory
omnibus clause.285 American Mutual indicates that the court
continues to regard maintenance of continuous insurance cover-
age as a primary purpose of the title and registration statutes.28
Unfortunately, the court gives no basis for its holding, leaving
uncertain the South Carolina law of vehicle title transfer.
On June 14, 1976, Marine Private Christopher Smith de-
cided to buy a new MG Midget from Southland Motors. The
salesman gave Smith a copy of the retail buyer's order to take to
his credit union to obtain financing. Smith paid a $100.00 de-
posit, signed the odometer mileage statement and a statement
certifying that he owed no personal property taxes, and received
282. 279 S.C. 101, 302 S.E.2d 854 (1983).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 104, 302 S.E.2d at 855.
285. Id. The statutory omnibus clause consists of two code sections, S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 56-9-810, 56-9-820 (1976). In general, an omnibus clause extends coverage under an
automobile liability policy to persons using the automobile owned by the named insured
with explicit or implied permission of the owner. BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 981 (5th ed.
1979). South Carolina had made such coverage mandatory.
286. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 276 S.C. 587, 590, 281 S.E.2d 116, 118 (1981).
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a military sales tax exemption form.2 7 Smith also signed a
South Carolina Highway Department form certifying that he
had an insurance policy "meeting the requirements of the South
Carolina Financial Responsibility Act."288 He was unable to sup-
ply the policy number and effective dates but promised to bring
the required information when he returned to pick up the car . 8 9
When Smith returned the next day his salesman was not on
duty. He gave a check for $4,181.00, $120.80 short of the
purchase price, to another salesman who delivered the car to
him. He did not return the sales tax exemption form or his pol-
icy number. The second salesman testified that Smith told him
he had left that information at the credit union and would bring
it in the next day, but Smith denied having made this
statement.290
Smith never returned to Southland. Although Southland
customarily secured registration and title for its customers, it
could not complete the procedure for Smith without the insur-
ance policy number and dates.2 91 Twenty-six days later, Smith
struck and seriously injured John Penton. Although dealer
plates expire ten days after sale, Southland's plates were still on
the car.292
Penton first brought a damage action against Southland
Motors and Smith. In that action Southland was granted a sum-
mary judgment and Smith was held liable for $350,000.293 Amer-
ican Mutual, Penton's insurer then brought this suit for a de-
claratory judgment to determine whether Smith was an
287. 279 S.C. at 102-03, 302 S.E.2d at 854-55.
288. Id. at 103, 302 S.E.2d at 855.
289. See Record at 34, 165.
290. 279 S.C. at 103, 302 S.E.2d at 855.
291. Record at 64, 79. According to Southland's president, the Highway Department
would not have processed the papers without the policy number and dates. Id. See infra
note 306 and accompanying text.
292. 279 S.C. 103, 302 S.E.2d at 855. Smith's salesman testified that he had tried to
reach Smith at the barracks on several occasions. Since dealer plates are not valid after
ten days he apparently believed Smith would be forced to return and, hence, probably
did not pursue him strenuously. See Record at 27, 35 & 49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-210
(1976) provides a ten day grace period for procuring registration and license plates. Since
the registration materials were still in the possession of Southland, it is at least arguable
that Southland should have been on notice that Smith might not have procured insur-
ance two weeks before the accident.
293. Record at 2. The theory on which Southland Motors was joined as a defendant
is not clear from either the record or the opinion.
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uninsured motorist or whether Southland's garage liability in-
surance provided coverage for the vehicle. The trial court held
that Southland's policy, issued by Universal Underwriters, cov-
ered the vehicle.0 4
The supreme court affirmed on appeal. The court reviewed
the evidence and found that it provided ample support for the
trial court's three factual findings: that Southland retained own-
ership of the car; that Universal's attempt to exclude coverage
contradicted the statutory omnibus clause; and that "the [exclu-
sionary] clause contradict[ed] other provisions of the policy thus
creating an ambiguity which [had to] be resolved in favor of
maintaining coverage.
'29 5
American Mutual makes it clear that automobile dealers
and their insurers face potential liability when they sell to an
individual who fails to procure insurance. However, the basis for
that liability is unclear. The opinion itself consists only of a re-
view of the facts of the case and an affirmation of the trial
court's findings. Not a single case or statute is cited by the court
in its discussion of ownership. There are, however, several prior
cases which may illuminate the holding in American Mutual.
First, American Mutual may be read as overruling two ear-
lier South Carolina cases which held that compliance with the
title certificate law was not necessary to transfer title."' Title
certificate laws describe the method of effectuating title trans-
fers. In some states these methods are mandatory and record ti-
tle is conclusive proof of ownership.297 In other states title certif-
icates are only prima facie evidence of ownership.288
Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Julian299 and St.
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Boykin 30 were declara-
294. 279 S.C. at 101, 302 S.E.2d at 854.
295. Id. at 104, 302 S.E.2d at 855.
296. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Boykin, 251 S.C. 236, 161 S.E.2d 818
(1968); Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Julian, 247 S.C. 89, 145 S.E.2d 685 (1965).
297. See, e.g., Greer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 441 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1969); Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 116 Ohio App. 22, 186 N.E.2d 208 (1961); Farm Bu-
reau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Ohio App. 12, 168 N.E.2d 159
(1957).
298. See, e.g., Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Muller, 98 N.J. Super. 119, 236 A.2d
182 (1967), afl'd, 103 N.J. Super. 9, 246 A.2d 493 (1968); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Guthiel, 2
N.Y.2d 584, 141 N.E.2d 909, 161 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1957).
299. 247 S.C. 89, 145 S.E.2d 685 (1965).
300. 251 S.C. 236, 161 S.E.2d 818 (1968).
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tory judgment actions brought by insurance companies in which
vehicle ownership determined liability under an insurance pol-
icy. In both cases the sellers failed to comply with the title cer-
tificate law, the buyers had no insurance, and automobile acci-
dents occurred. In neither case did the seller's failure to comply
prevent the buyer from being found legal owner of the car." 1
Grain Dealers concerned a casual sale between individuals.
Section 46-150.15 (now Section 56-19-360) of the South Carolina
Code requires a seller who has title to a vehicle to deliver the
documents necessary to transfer title to either the buyer or the
Highway Department.302 The seller did neither but the court
concluded "under the facts. . . disclosed. . . even though [the
buyer] did not have a certificate of title. . . he was, in fact, the
owner of the automobile ... .
In St. Paul, an automobile dealer bought and resold a used
car without having title transferred to its name. Section 46-
150.16 (now Section 56-19-370) of the South Carolina Code re-
quires a dealer in that situation to deliver all necessary docu-
ments to the Highway Department. 04 However, in St. Paul, the
dealer-seller, having endorsed the certificate of title and the re-
gistration and properly executed the transfer form, gave these
documents, and the application for a new certificate of title, to
the buyer for processing. Although the buyer never completed
the transfer, the court held "[c]ompliance with the Title Certifi-
cate law is not necessary to transfer ownership under 46-
150.16. ''M
05
Although American MutUal involves a slightly different
sales situation to which section 56-19-240306 arguably applies,
301. Id. at 241-42, 161 S.E.2d at 821; 247 S.C. at 99, 145 S.E.2d at 690.
302. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-19-360 (1976).
303. 247 S.C. at 99, 145 S.E.2d at 690.
304. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-19-370 (1976).
305. 251 S.C. at 242, 161 S.E.2d at 821.
306. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-19-240 (1976) reads in pertinent part: "If the application
refers to a vehicle purchased from a dealer, it shall... be signed by the dealer as well as
the owner, and the dealer shall promptly mail or deliver the application to the Depart-
ment." (emphasis added).
This section has since been amended to apply to all certificate applications. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 56-19-240 (Supp. 1983). Since the MG Midget had never been titled, South-
land was obliged by § 56-19-240 to apply for the first title. Southland and Universal took
the position that § 56-19-360, which allows a dealer who holds title to a vehicle to deliver
the transfer documents to either the buyer or the Department, applied exclusively.
American Mutual and Penton argued that § 56-19-240 limited § 56-19-360, requiring
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the following language which appears in both of the earlier deci-
sions is quite broad and would seem applicable to all statutes
prescribing transfer mechanisms: "We have no statute which
makes void transfers of sales of motor vehicles which are not
made in compliance with the terms of the Title Certificate
law. 301 7  Section 56-19-240 requires dealer-sellers of new
automobiles to mail or deliver the application for first certificate
of title, accompanied by the manufacturer's certificate of origin,
to the Highway Department.30 8 On the date of the accident,
Southland still held the necessary transfer documents. Thus,
Southland's failure to deliver the documents may have pre-
vented the transfer of ownership, signaling that compliance is
now mandatory and that Grain Dealers and St. Paul are no
longer good law.
Since the court cites neither case law nor the title certificate
law, a more likely basis for the holding is intent. Even if compli-
ance with title statutes is not always necessary to effectuate a
change in ownership, section 56-19-320309 makes a certificate of
title prima facie evidence of ownership, which the record owner
may rebut by presenting evidence that someone else is the true
owner.3 10 There was no title certificate in American Mutual, but
in its absence the trial judge reasoned that the manufacturer's
statement of origin was prima facie evidence of Southland's
ownership.3 11 He thought Southland had failed to rebut the pre-
sumption in part because it had failed to comply with the stat-
utes: "[S]uch failure [while not conclusive] . . . stands as strong
evidence that Southland intended to remain as owner of the
Southland to mail the application for certificate of title to the Department. The trial
court did not decide this question since "the terms of neither statute were complied
with." (emphasis in original). Record at 145. Although § 56-19-360 appears to mandate
compliance to effectuate transfer, it specifically excepts "the parties" from this result.
See Brief of Appellant at 19-20. Section 56-19-240 has no similar exception.
307. 247 S.C. at 99, 145 S.E.2d at 690; 251 S.C. at 241-42, 161 S.E.2d at 821 (citing
247 S.C. at 99, 145 S.E.2d at 690).
308. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
309. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-19-320 (1976).
310. See 247 S.C. at 98, 145 S.E.2d at 689. See also Tollinson v. Reaves, 277 S.C.
443, 445, 289 S.E.2d 163, 164 (1982); Bankers Ins. Co. of Pa. v. Griffin, 244 S.C. 552, 556,
137 S.E.2d 785, 786 (1964).
311. Record at 145. The trial judge thought § 56-19-320 could reasonably be ex-
tended to a manufacturer's statement of origin. Although the judge found that the state-
ment of origin listed Southland as owner, Southland contested this finding on appeal.
Brief of Appellant at 24-25. See also Record at 161-62.
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automobile." '312
The trial court also distinguished both Grain Dealers and
St. Paul on intent grounds: "[I]n both [cases] . . . the evidence
showed that the seller intended that ownership pass to the pur-
chaser .. ."313 The seller in Grain Dealers delivered a registra-
tion and bill of sale to the purchaser who executed a chattel
mortgage in which he "represented that he was the sole owner of
the automobile. ' 314 In St. Paul, the automobile dealer-seller de-
livered all necessary transfer documents to the buyer rather
than to the Highway Department.1
More recently, a third case, Travelers Insurance Co. v. Law-
son,316 was decided on the basis of intent. In Travelers no formal
title transfer was made, but the buyer added the vehicle to his
insurance policy. The court held that in these circumstances the
buyer and seller clearly intended to transfer ownership and
found the buyer's insurance company to be solely liable.3 1 7 Ap-
parently action by either the buyer or the seller may suffice to
show the requisite intent. In this context, American Mutual is
particularly significant because it deals with an issue specifically
reserved by Travelers. The court in Travelers noted:
In holding that Travelers is responsible, we do not necessarily
imply that Penn National and/or the seller would not under
any circumstances be liable in a different factual situation. For
example, if the buyer had not procured insurance coverage, a
different issue would be presented. The public has been pro-
312. Record at 146. Judge Robinson noted several other factors which he considered
indicative of Southland's intention to retain ownership, including: (1) Southland's failure
to deliver the documents to anyone; (2) the salesman's delivering the car without full
payment or completion of the sales tax exemption form; and (3) the salesman's apparent
doubt of the existence of Smith's insurance policy. Since Southland was eager to make a
sale, Judge Robinson reasoned that it was logical to assume it intended to give Smith use
of the car while retaining ownership and while supplying continuous insurance coverage.
See id. at 146-47.
313. Id. at 141. Judge Robinson interpreted Grain Dealers and St. Paul to mean
that technical noncompliance with the title certificate laws will not prevent a transfer of
ownership when there is evidence to show an intent to pass ownership. Id. at 140. See
also S.C. Farm Bureau v. Scott, 274 S.C. 264, 266-67, 262 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1980) (owner-
ship for purposes of insurance coverage decided in light of particular facts and circum-
stances of the case).
314. 247 S.C. at 94, 145 S.E.2d at 687.
315. 251 S.C. at 238, 161 S.E.2d at 819.
316. 276 S.C. 587, 281 S.E.2d 116 (1981).
317. Id. at 589-90, 281 S.E.2d at 117-18.
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tected. As between the buyer and seller, the buyer should be
responsible. 18
Although not the only factor, Travelers indicates that insurance
is an important factor in determining intent to transfer title. If
the buyer is insured, intent is shown; if not, the seller must show
intent by his own actions.
American Mutual does not make clear exactly what actions
are necessary, but certainly a dealer cannot retain the docu-
ments necessary for title registration and then argue that it in-
tended to relinquish control over the vehicle. 319
The final possible explanation for American Mutual is an
estoppel theory. In St. Paul the court stated, "[L]iability insur-
ance or its equivalent is not a requirement for ownership of a
motor vehicle or for obtaining a certificate of title but it is a
prerequisite to licensing and registration of the motor vehi-
cle. .. ."310 Furthermore, "[t]he duty of complying with the re-
gistration statutes is placed on the owner of a motor vehicle.
3 21
When a dealer undertakes to apply for registration and licensing
as did Southland, it should be estopped from denying ownership
since the vehicle would otherwise be uninsured.
Whether mandatory compliance, intent, or estoppel is the
theoretical basis of American Mutual, the title statutes play an
important part in determining ownership. Fundamentally, the
holder of record title will be presumed to be the owner. This
presumption will hold unless the buyer evidences a contrary in-
tent by purchasing insurance, or the dealer-seller shows by posi-
tive action an intent to permanently relinquish its claim to the
vehicle. It is unclear, however, after Travelers and the amend-
ment to section 56-19-240,322 whether delivery of transfer docu-
ments by the dealer to the purchaser will support a finding of
intent when the buyer does not procure insurance. Since section
56-19-240 appears to require dealers in all situations to mail or
deliver the documents to the Highway Department, a good faith
318. Id. at 590, 281 S.E.2d at 118.
319. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-200 (1976) prevents registration until title has been ap-
plied for or issued. A dealer who retains the title application prevents the purchaser from
registering and licensing, i.e., operating the vehicle.
320. 251 S.C. at 241, 161 S.E.2d at 821.
321. Id. (emphasis added).
322. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
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effort to comply with the title certificate law may not be suffi-
cient evidence of intent. In practice, the Department will not is-
sue titles without concurrent registration.2 Since registration is
conditioned upon insurance, a dealer who wishes to show intent
by compliance will have to supply the Department with credible
insurance data. 24 Furthermore, this Department practice in ef-
fect forces the dealer to assume the registration duty so that
failure to supply the required information may estop the dealer
from denying ownership.
Realizing that dealer-sellers will often retain ownership af-
ter vehicles are delivered to potential buyers, what can a garage
insurer do to limit its exposure? Apparently nothing. The South
Carolina statutory omnibus clause requires that every insurance
policy issued to an owner of a motor vehicle cover any person
"who uses [the covered motor vehicle] with the consent, ex-
pressed or implied, of the named insured."' 25 In a sales situation
it would be difficult indeed for an insurer to assert convincingly
that the dealer did not give at least implied permission to a pro-
spective purchaser.
The basis for the American Mutual holding may be ob-
scure, but the message it sends is clear. There will be continuous
liability insurance coverage for every vehicle in this state if any
possible justification for that liability can be established. Garage
insurers can only demand that their insureds comply with all
applicable statutes and obtain adequate insurance data before
giving up possession.
Elizabeth Bowe Anders
VIII. CANCELLATION OF AN INSURANCE POLICY AS A DEFENSE
Edens v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Co.326 came before the South Carolina Supreme Court in May of
1983. In its decision, Edens 1,327 the court held that South Caro-
lina law does not require an insurer to prove that the insured
actually received notice of cancellation in order for the policy
323. See Record at 104 (deposition testimony of Highway Department employee).
324. S.C. State Highway Dept. R., S.C. CODE ANN. (R. & REG.) 63-441 (1976).
325. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-810(2) (1976).
326. Edens v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., No. 21929 (S.C. ified May 25, 1983).
327. The court's initial opinion shall be referred to hereinafter as Edens L
19841
53
Wilkinson et al.: Business and Insurance Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cancellation to be effective. The insurer need prove only that it
properly mailed the notice to the insured's address.328 In Octo-
ber 1983, the court granted a rehearing, and upon reconsidera-
tion, withdrew Edens I and substituted Edens 11,329 which held
that actual receipt of notice of cancellation is a condition prece-
dent to cancellation of an insurance policy which does not other-
wise specify a method of cancellation.3 0 With this opinion,
South Carolina adopted the majority rule. 31
The plaintiff, J.M. Edens, Jr., owned a homeowner's insur-
ance policy, issued by the defendant, for approximately twenty
years. In January 1974, Edens sent the defendant a check to re-
new the insurance policy that covered his home, valued at sev-
enty thousand ($70,000) dollars, and its contents, valued at
thirty-five thousand ($35,000) dollars. In the fall of that year,
the house was totally destroyed by fire. The insurance company
refused to honor Edens' claim because of an alleged cancellation
of the policy two months before the fire. 3 2
The defendant alleged that on August 13, 1974, it sent
plaintiff a cancellation notice and a refund of the unearned pre-
mium. Defendant followed its "normal cancellation procedure"
which included entering Edens' name and correct address in de-
fendant's mailing book, taking Edens' cancellation notice and re-
fund check to the post office, paying the postage, giving the en-
velope to the post office clerk, and receiving a post office receipt
for the envelope. Edens claimed he never received the notice of
cancellation or the refund check, which never cleared the bank.
The Federal Land Bank and the National Bank of South Caro-
lina, holders of mortgages on the property, received notice of
cancellation but never informed Edens.
333
Edens brought this action against his insurer, South Caro-
lina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. (Farm Bureau), to re-
cover proceeds under his insurance policy. The jury found for
Farm Bureau and Edens asked for a directed verdict or a judg-
328. Edens I, No. 21929, slip op. at 3.
329. Edens v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 377, 308 S.E.2d 670
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Edens II].
330. Id. at 380, 308 S.E.2d at 671. This holding was the direct opposite of that of
Edens I, as what had been the dissent became the majority.
331. See infra note 353 and accompanying text.
332. 279 S.C. at 379, 308 S.E.2d at 671.
333. Id. at 381, 308 S.E.2d at 672.
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ment non obstante veredicto. The trial judge refused to grant
either, and Edens appealed. In Edens I, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court held for Farm Bureau. 334 In Edens II, the court
reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of
Edens.
3 3 5
There appears to be no authority which has determined de-
finitively whether actual receipt by the insured of a cancellation
notice mailed by the insurer is a condition precedent to a valid
cancellation of the policy.336 The issue has been resolved, how-
ever, by interpretation of the language of an applicable stat-
ute,337 or, in the absence of a statute, by interpretation of the
language of the poicy.3 38 The general rule is that a cancellation
provision should be construed strictly in favor of the insured. 39
Thus, an ambiguous cancellation provision will be construed as
requiring actual receipt of notice by the insured. Many insur-
ance companies have attempted to avoid this result by clearly
specifying in their policies that mailing of a cancellation notice
constitutes sufficient notice.
34 0
The cancellation clause of Edens' insurance contract al-
lowed for cancellation "by giving to the insured a five days' writ-
ten notice of cancellation. ' ' 4s The court found this provision to
be "clearly ambiguous" in describing the method for giving no-
tice. Where the language of an insurance policy is ambiguous or
capable of two reasonable interpretations, the construction that
334. Edens I, No. 21929, slip op. at 3.
335. 279 S.C. at 378, 308 S.E.2d at 671.
336. 43 AM. JuR.2D Insurance § 391 (1982) and cases cited therein. See also Annot.,
64 A.L.R.2D 982 (1959 & Later Case Service 1984) and cases cited therein. Black v. Fidel-
ity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 582 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1978), and Ampy v. Metropolitan
Casualty Ins. Co. of N.Y., 200 Va. 396, 105 S.E.2d 839 (1958), speak of this apparent
conflict of authority, and Black, interpreting Mississippi law, describes a way to resolve
it.
337. See, e.g., Black, 582 F.2d at 984; DiProspero v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
30 Conn. Supp. 291, 311 A.2d 561 (1973).
338. See, e.g., Pence Mortgage Co. v. Stokes, 559 S.W.2d 500 (Ky. App. 1977);
Anchor Casualty Co. v. Crisp, 346 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Rocque v. Co-Op.
Fire Ins. Ass'n of Vt., 140 Vt. 321, 438 A.2d 383 (1981).
339. See infra note 342 and accompanying text.
340. In his dissent to Edens I, Chief Justice Lewis emphasized the power of insur-
ance companies to write their own contracts. This power gives rise to the policy of con-
struing insurance contracts in favor of the insured in case of ambiguity. Because insur-
ance companies can include all of their own terms in the policy, they should not be
allowed to benefit from ambiguity. Edens I, No. 21929, slip op. at 8.
341. 279 S.C. at 579, 308 S.E.2d at 671 (quoting the insurance policy).
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is most favorable to the insured will be adopted.3 42 On the facts
of Edens II, "giving written notice" should be interpreted to
mean some method of notice other than mere mailing, because if
the provision were interpreted to allow the insurance company
simply to drop the letter in the mail, the insured would be de-
nied coverage.343 The court suggested that notice by registered
or certified mail, or at least a request for a return receipt, would
have been more effective as methods of cancellation.
The court distinguished Moore v. Palmetto Bank & Textile
Co. 344 on the basis of the different wording in its cancellation
clause, which read as follows:
This policy may be cancelled by the company by mailing to the
insured named in Item 1 of the declarations at the address
shown in this policy written notice stating when not less than
ten days thereafter such shall be effective. The mailing of no-
tice as aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of notice.345
Another provision in the Moore policy stated that "[tihe mailing
of notice as aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of notice, '346 ex-
pressly negating the necessity of actual receipt. Stating that
"[t]he right to cancel a policy can be exercised only in the man-
ner provided in the policy. . .," the court found that cancel-
lation by mailing was the manner specifically required; the terms
"mailing written notice" and "giving written notice" were held
to be neither synonymous nor substantially similar.34 ' Because
"notice" implies becoming personally aware, the court in Edens
342. Id. See also Tobin v. Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 606 (4th Cir.
1982). In Tobin, the appeals court set out some general rules of interpretation applicable
to insurance contracts in South Carolina. In Gaskins v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of S.C.,
271 S.C. 101, 105, 245 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1978), the South Carolina Supreme Court de-
scribed "well established legal principles under South Carolina law governing the con-
struction of insurance contracts."
343. Edens II, 279 S.C. at 379, 308 S.E.2d at 671. In Gaskins, 271 S.C. at 108, 245
S.E.2d at 602, the court stated that "when an insurance policy such as this one is suscep-
tible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one of which would provide coverage,
this Court must hold as a matter of law in favor of coverage."
344. 238 S.C. 341, 120 S.E.2d 231 (1961).
345. Id. at 344, 120 S.E.2d at 233.
346. Id. at 345, 120 S.E.2d at 233. See also McElmurray v. Am. Fidelity Fire Ins.
Co., 236 S.C. 195, 203, 113 S.E.2d 528, 532 (1960) in which the court found actual deliv-
ery to be unnecessary in light of a similar clause.
347. 238 S.C. at 344, 120 S.E.2d at 233.
348. Edens II, 279 S.C. at 379, 308 S.E.2d at 671.
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II interpreted "giving written notice" to mean that the insured
shall personally receive the notice. 49 The court quoted from
Selken v. Northland Insurance Co.350 when it found that per-
sonal receipt of a document could not be accomplished by sim-
ply depositing a document in the mail because the insured might
or might not receive it.
Selken is a case of statutory interpretation. Iowa's statute
required the "giving of notice" whereas the defendant's insur-
ance policy provided for the "mailing of notice." The Iowa Su-
preme Court, interpreting the applicable statute, found that
"giving" meant that the insured should personally receive the
notice and that "notice" meant that the insured should receive
it so that he or she becomes "aware of the notice. '3 51 Because
physical delivery was required for the insured to become aware
of the cancellation, the court held the policy's cancellation provi-
sion ineffective as violative of the statute. Although Selken in-
terpreted a statute, the same interpretation can be applied by
analogy to the similar language in the policy provisions in Edens
//.352
The majority rule provides that when a policy permits can-
cellation after a specified number of days' notice to the insured,
actual receipt of notice by the insured is a condition precedent
to cancellation.3 53 Cancellation of an insurance policy is an af-
349. Id. See also Selken v. Northland Ins. Co., 249 Iowa 1046, 90 N.W.2d 29 (1958).
In Selken, the Iowa Supreme Court interpreted "giving written notice" in the context of
the Iowa statute. The wording of the Iowa statute, at that time, was substantially similar
to the cancellation clause of Edens' policy.
350. See discussion supra note 349.
351. 249 Iowa 1046, 1053, 90 N.W.2d 29, 33 (1958).
352. For other cases interpreting the language of such statutes, see Black, 582 F.2d
at 984 (interpreting a Mississippi statute governing the cancellation of automobile insur-
ance), and DiProspero, 30 Conn. Supp. at 291, 311 A.2d at 561 (interpreting the phrase
"giving notice" in a cancellation statute).
353. Edens II, 279 S.C. at 380, 308 S.E.2d at 671. See 43 Am. Jur. 2D Insurance §
391 (1982) for a statement of the rule. See also Annot., 64 A.L.R.2D 982 (1959 & Later
Case Service 1984)(stating the same rule along with cases that have followed it). Of
course, this majority rule is premised upon a specific type of cancellation notice set by
the policy.
There are basically five different types of cancellation notices: (1) Notice must be
sent to the insured when no form is stipulated. Actual receipt of the notice is required.
(2) Cancellation may be effected by mailing the notice to the address of the insured as
stated in the policy. Mailing is sufficient to cancel. (3) Cancellation may be effected with
notice to the insured within a specified number of days. Actual receipt is a condition
precedent to cancellation. The time requirement is intended to give the insured timely
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firmative defense, the burden of proof being on the party who
asserted cancellation. In Edens II, the insurance company as-
serted cancellation but could not prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that Edens actually received the notice.'"
Justice Harwell's dissent in Edens II argued that the trial
court adequately charged the jury when it presented the issue as
two equally weighted questions: (1) whether the insured mailed
the notice properly addressed with postage prepaid, and (2)
whether the insured received the notice.3 55 The dissent reiter-
ated the view, espoused by Edens I, that the insurer need not
prove actual receipt by the insured. Justice Harwell based this
view on the language in Moore which indicated that mere mail-
ing was sufficient not only where a cancellation clause specifi-
cally provided that the insurer might cancel by mailing the no-
information that the policy is to be cancelled. See Columbia Casualty Co. v. Wright, 235
F.2d 462, 464 (4th Cir. 1956) which states that "[c]ancellation of an insurance contract,
upon which the insured is relying for protection, is drastic action, and the requirement of
five days' notice is obviously to enable the insured to secure insurance protection from
some other company." (4) Use of the "standard cancellation provision" in which cancel-
lation is effected by mailing to the insured, at his address, written notice stating a speci-
fied number of days in which cancellation will be effective. Mailing is specifically pro-
vided to be sufficient proof of notice and the majority rule holds that actual receipt is
not a precondition under the express terms of the contract. (5) Cancellation may be
made by registered mail. Actual receipt of the notice is not a condition precedent to its
effectiveness. Annot., 64 A.L.R.2D 982, 988-1019 (1959 & Later Case Service 1984).
354. 279 S.C. at 380, 308 S.E.2d at 671. The court at this point stated that it was not
going to reach any other issues, since the decision that the insurance policy was still in
effect made this unnecessary. In Edens I, the plaintiff argued that the attempted cancel-
lation of the insurance policy was ineffective because the language of the cancellation
notice did not comply with the policy terms. The policy required that "[n]otice of cancel-
lation shall state that said excess premium (if not tendered) will be refunded on de-
mand." Although the cancellation notice did not repeat this language, Farm Bureau
claimed that it sent the refund check with the cancellation notice as required. The court
held that since the refund check for the unearned premium accompanied the cancella-
tion notice, the defendant did comply with the terms of the policy concerning premium
refunds, and therefore, the policy was valid. Edens I, No. 21929, slip op. at 4.
355. Edens II, 279 S.C. at 381, 308 S.E.2d at 672. In Glenn v. Western Union TeL
Co., 84 S.C. 155, 65 S.E. 1024 (1909), the South Carolina Supreme Court found that
evidence of a proper mailing raises a presumption that the messages were received by the
addressee. It further found that when receipt of them is denied, an equally strong pre-
sumption is raised that they were never mailed. Thus, mailing and receipt were issues of
fact for the jury. In a case factually similar to Edens II, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
found that a like presumption was raised by evidence of proper mailing rebuttable by
evidence to the contrary, such as a denial of receipt by the insured. Anchor Casualty Co.
v. Crisp, 346 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). Thus, in Edens II, the jury charge was
correct and the jury obviously did not believe that Edens had successfully rebutted the
presumption of proper mailing.
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tice to the insured's address but also where the clause contained
substantially similar language. Finally, Justice Harwell agreed
that the issue could have been avoided by sending the notice by
registered or certified mail, but noted that the South Carolina
legislature has yet to approve such a method for fire insurers, as
it has for accident, health, hospitalization and automobile
insurers.356
In South Carolina National Bank v. Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co.357 the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina reached a result similar to that of the South
Carolina Supreme Court in Edens II, although under slightly
different circumstances. South Carolina National Bank (SCN)
brought an action in contract to collect upon an automobile in-
surance policy issued by the defendant to Barry Bowen, with
SCN, as lienholder, named the loss payee. The policy provided
for notice of cancellation by mail to the insured, but failed to
state the manner in which notice would be given to the
lienholder. SCN never received notice of the cancellation and for
that reason the court found the cancellation ineffective as to
SCN, stating: "This policy required Plaintiff be given prior noti-
fication. No particular method of notice was specified. The gen-
erally accepted rule is that where an insurance policy simply re-
quires notice, without stipulating any particular form, actual
receipt of such notice is a condition precedent to cancellation by
356. Edens II, 279 S.C. at 382 n.1, 308 S.E.2d at 672 n.1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-35-
110 (1976), in referring to cancellation of accident, health and hospitalization policies,
states that an "insurer may cancel this policy by written notice delivered to the insured
or mailed to his last address as shown by the records of the insurer, stating when, not
less than five days thereafter, such cancellation shall be effective." S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-
37-1450 (1976), in referring to cancellation of an automobile insurance policy, states that
"no cancellation... by an insurer of a policy of automobile insurance shall be effective
unless the insurer shall deliver or mail, to the named insured at the address shown in the
policy, a written notice of the cancellation ...." Some jurisdictions which follow the
"minority view" might not interpret the cancellation statute for accident, health and
hospitalization policies in the manner that the dissent assumes. Serves v. Eureka Casu-
alty Co., 103 Ohio App. 268, 3 Ohio Ops. 2d 307, 144 N.E.2d 120 (1957) and Smith v.
Globe Am. Casualty Co., 38 Ohio Misc. 82, 313 N.E.2d 21 (1973) both contain good expo-
sitions of the minority rule which applies to language allowing mailing within a specified
number of days, as does S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-35-110 (1976). The courts hold that by
establishing a specific notice period, insurance companies imply that the insured must
receive the notice for it to become effective.
357. 526 F. Supp. 94 (D.S.C. 1981).
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the insurer. ''858
A case factually similar to Edens II is Anchor Casualty Co.
v. Crisp.359 There, the insured's five-year fire insurance policy
was cancelled for nonpayment of premium by written notice
mailed on June 10, 1959. On November 18, 1959, the insured's
house was totally destroyed by fire. The insurance company re-
fused to pay because of its purported cancellation prior to the
loss. The insured claimed never to have received the cancellation
notice. The court held that the policy was in effect at the time of
the fire because the cancellation was invalid.360 The cancellation
clause of the policy was similar to that of Edens' policy. The
Texas court stated, "This [cancellation] clause is clearly distin-
guishable from those permitting an insurer to cancel the policy
by mailing written notice to the insured's address,' or simi-
larly phrased clauses."3 6 ' When "mailing" is specified, the court
continued, actual receipt is not required; however, when "mail-
ing" is not specified, actual receipt is a condition precedent to
cancellation. The court also applied the "settled rule" that ac-
tual receipt is also a condition precedent to cancellation when a
policy requires a certain number of days' notice."6 2
Clearly, Edens II followed the majority rule for policies con-
taining the "giving notice" wording. The court in Edens I be-
lieved it was following the South Carolina rule as enunciated in
Moore, reasoning that "giving written notice" was substantially
similar to "mailing notice." The majority of courts, however, in-
tepret and define the terms differently. Edens II thus conformed
to each of the two fact patterns which trigger the requirement of
358. Id. at 96 (citing Sherrod v. Farmers Mut. Fire Ass'n, 139 N.C. 167, 51 S.E. 910
(1905)).
359. 346 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). Another similar case is Rocque v. Co-
operative Fire Ins. Ass'n of Vt., 140 Vt. 321, 438 A.2d 383 (1981), in which the court
stated that, "Even where facts show that a cancellation notice was mailed to the insured,
if the policy demands that notice be 'given' and the notice was never received, the notice
is ineffective as a valid cancellation." Id. at 325, 438 A.2d at 386. In Pence Mortgage Co.
v. Stokes, 559 S.W.2d 500 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), a Kentucky court interpreted "giving
notice" and "mailing notice." When "giving notice" is required to effect cancellation
under a policy, the insurance company has the strict burden of proving, as a condition
precedent to any cancellation, actual receipt of notice by the intended recipients. When
the policy requires "mailing notice," the cancellation is effective when mailing has been
proven. Id. at 506.
360. 346 S.W.2d at 367.
361. Id. (emphasis added).
362. Id.
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actual receipt as a precondition to cancellation because (1) no
form for the notice was specified, and (2) the insured was given a
specified number of days' notice.
In the future, insurance companies which seek to cancel
their policies merely by mailing a notice of cancellation must
specify by the terms of their policies that cancellation is to be
effected by mailing notice to the address of the insured as it ap-
pears in the policy. Insurers should also be aware that a court
may follow the minority rule in those cases in which the policy
specifies mailing and a certain number of days for cancellation
to become effective. The court in Edens seemed to approve of
notices sent by registered mail, thus suggesting a potentially via-
ble alternative in South Carolina. Until the legislature passes a
statute governing the cancellation of fire insurance policies in
South Carolina, insurance companies must draft their cancella-
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